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Introduction
An analysis of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste requires a
comparative examination of three main regulatory entities.
First, the international Basel Convention on the Control of the Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal will be covered. More particularly,
an inquiry of its raison d'etre, will be followed by a critical examination of its goals and
mechanisms. The relationship the United States has with the Convention and its national
approach towards the export of hazardous waste will be covered next. A brief
investigation of the real situation impacts of the Basel Convention will finalize this
chapter.
The second part will explore the actual regulatory scheme in the European Union
concerning the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste, Within, Into and Out of
the European Community, which is reflected in the Regulation 259/93, applicable since
May 1994. After studying its main features, some greater attention will be given to its
striking 'right to ban' clause. Especially, the precursory influences of this particular
provision, as can be found in the Belgian Waste Case, rendered by the European Court of
Justice, will be touched upon.
The last part will analyze the approach by the United States Supreme Court
towards the issue of interstate and intrastate movement of (hazardous) wastes rendered in
its main decisions. The cases will be discussed extensively, and wherever possible a
comparison will be made with the judgments by the European Court of Justice
Chapter I.
The background of the Basel Convention ;
A.Western realities...
The global annual generation of hazardous waste has increased from roughly 5
million metric tons in 1947 1 to over 400 million tons in 1998. 2 About 98% of all toxic
wastes and hazardous substances are produced by the 25 members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), 3 of which the biggest share (275
million tons a year) can be attributed to the United States." Of the worldwide generation
of hazardous waste, at least 10% enters into international trade. 5 And even though the
vast majority of the hazardous waste export and import movements are transacted
1 David P. Hackett, An assessment ofthe Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements
ofHazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 5 AM. U. J. IT. L. & POL'Y 291, 294 (1990).
2 Press Release : Ministers to Specijy the Hazardous Wastes That Are Subject to Export Ban
,
Malaysia,
23 February 1998, (visited Nov. 3, 1998) <http://www.unhip.ch/basil/sbc/pry.htm> (hereinafter Press
Release: Ministers in Malaysia).
'Kenneth D. Hirsch, Possibilitiesfor a Unified International Convention on the Transboundary
Shipments ofHazardous Wastes, 10 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1997). Current OECD members
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Mexico.
4 Donna Valin, The Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements ofHazardous Waste
and Their Disposal: Should the United States Ratify the Accord ?, 6 IND. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 268
(1995). See Jeffrey D. Williams, Trashing Developing Nations: the Global Hazardous Waste Trade, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 276 (1991) (Mentioning how the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment asserts
that the figure is actually twice as high, nearly 575 million tons).
5 Press Release : Ministers in Malaysia, supra note 2.
3between OECD-members, 6 developing countries, as well as Eastern and Central European
States are becoming increasingly targeted and vulnerable destinations for the export of
hazardous waste. 7
There are several reasons underlaying the increase of the export of hazardous
wastes from developed countries to the developing countries since the 1980s. First, the
growth of stringent administrative and legal regulations, and therefore the increased cost of
the economic activity related to the disposal and management of hazardous wastes in
industrialized countries.
8
For example, in both Europe and the United States disposal
costs which, prior to the enactment of environmental legislation averaged between $2.50
and $ 50 per ton rose up to $2,500 per ton, 9 whereas in many developing countries prices
remained between $ 3 and $20 per ton. 10 Therefore, big industrial companies are able to
offer a payment to developing countries equal to a manifold of their gross national
product, in exchange for the acceptance of the import of hazardous waste, and still pay
significantly less than if they would comply with their own more stringent national
6 Hao-Nhien Q. Vu, The Law of Treaties and the Export ofHazardous Waste, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 389, 404 (1994) ( holding that at least 80% of the toxic waste export from OECD-countries is
destined for another OECD member); Valin, supra note 4 (e.g. approximately 85% of the United States
export of hazardous waste goes to Canada and 12 % is sent to Mexico); See Peter D. P. Vint, The
International Export ofHazardous Waste: European Economic Community, United States and
International Law, 129 MIL. L. REV. 126, 130 (1990) (extensive analysis of the existing bilateral treaties
between the United States and Canada, and the United States and Mexico).
7
Press Release: Progress on Legal Issues Related to the Basel Convention (visited on Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.unhip.ch/basil/sbc/pr6-97.htm> (hereinafter Press Release: Progress), Valentina O. Okaru,
The Basel Convention: Controlling the Movement ofHazardous Wastes to Developing Countries,
4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP 137, 139 (1993).
' Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimesfor the Transboundary Movement ofHazardous Wastes,
88 A.J.I.L. 24, 30-31 (1994) (giving an of the United States, where "nearly half of of some 4,600 facilities
that treat,store, or dispose of hazardous wastes decided to close during the 1980's because of increased
regulation").
9 Okaru, supra note 7, at 141.
10 Sylvia F. Liu, The Koko Incident: Developing International Normsfor the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.,125 (1992-1993).
4environmental laws." Second,the shrinking geographical space for the installation of
waste facilities in many industrialized countries. 12 Third, the rise of public awareness in
the industrialized countries,
13
culminating in a citizens hostility towards the acceptance of
waste in their own community (so-called 'not in my backyard' or 'NIMBY' syndrome). 1 "
This awareness was strengthened by what scientists and later media have described as the
"boomerang effect" or "circle of poison", which can occur when an agricultural country
that has previously imported hazardous wastes, exports food products, thereby
endangering human health elsewhere. 15 And,fourth, the controversial theory of
international environmental racism, which holds that developing countries are being used
as a dumping ground "not because of cost or convenience but because of race and
poverty", should be mentioned. 16
11 Williams, supra note 4, at 278 (explaining in more detail the often quoted example of Guinea Bissau : a
plan by Detroit industrialists to export 4 million of U.S. auto-industry hazardous waste was discovered in
time, i.e. before Lindaco Inc. of Delaware could ship the waste to Guinea Bissau, for the payment $ 300
million spread over 5 years, an amount twice the country's gross national product); Grant L. Kratz,
Implementing the Basel Convention Into U.S. Law: Will it Help or Hinder Recycling Efforts?, 6 BYU J.
PUB L. 324 (1992) (mentioning the same case in a different version: $120 million per year,an amount
close to the country's national product); Liu, supra note 10, at 142 (adding that the payment would have
totaled a tripplefold of the country's foreign debt).
12 Murphy, supra note 8, at 30; Okaru, supra note 7, at 140.
13 Murphy, supra note 8, at 30.
14 John Ansbro, The EU Regulation on Waste Shipment: in Conflict With the Free Market and Contrary to
Environmental Comparative Advantage, 3 CARDOZO J. INTL & COMP. L. 410 (1995); Muthu S.
Sundram, Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement ofHazardous Waste: Total Ban Amendment, 9
PACE INTL L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (the author further mentions that as the NIMBY syndrome took roots,
"elected officials responded in kind - with a NIMTO (not in my term of office) syndrome").
15 Murphy, supra note 8, at 32; See also Okaru, supra note 7, at 145 ("Statistics prepared by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) confirm that about 10% of commodities imported into the United States from
developing countries contain illegal (banned and unregistered chemicals) residues of pesticides").
16 See Rozelia S. Park, An Examination ofInternational Environmental Racism Through the Lens of
Transboundary Movement ofHazardous Wastes, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 660 (1998).
B. developing countries' tragedies
It took many sad and well-publicized incidents to provoke a global reaction
against the unregulated transboundary movement of hazardous wastes on an international
level.
17 Some of the more shocking examples will be given, not out of sensationalism, but
merely because they do not deserve to be buried in a footnote.
In 1988 Nigerian students living in Italy alerted the Nigerian government to a
scheme through which an Italian waste trader had arranged for 3,800 tons of hazardous
wastes, originating from the United States, to be stored in Nigeria on a dirt lot near the
home of one of its poorest citizens in exchange for $100 a month. 18 The Nigerian
President Ibrahim Babangida reacted promptly by recalling the Nigerian ambassador from
Italy. The Minister of External Affairs asked the United Nations to intervene and to send
a clear message to international corporations to stop dumping wastes in Africa. 19 Not
only did the Minister of Justice threaten to take legal action against Italy by bringing the
matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but president Babangida warned that
anyone found guilty of importing radioactive waste would be shot. 20 Only one week after
the scandal broke out, a special tribunal was set up to try fifteen people allegedly
involved in the scheme, including an Italian partner, and to order Italy to retrieve the
wastes at stake.
21
In the weeks following the discovery Nigerian health officials reported
17 See Mark E. Allen, Slowing Europe 's Hazardous Waste Trade: Implementing the Basel Convention Into
European Union Law, 6 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 165 (1995) ("International attention
began to focus on the toxic waste trade as early as 1981, when a group of experts met in Montevideo,
Uruguay, to examine issues relating to toxic waste handling, storage and transport"); Murphy, supra note
8, at 34 (Probably one of the earliest efforts to regulate certain aspects of the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste can be found in the United Nations 'Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods' of 1957).
18
Liu, supra note 10, at 131 and at 126 (adding that the Italian businessman involved would have gained
$4.3 million in profit).
"Id., at 131.
20
Id., at 132.
21
Ibid.
6that some dock workers suffered severe chemical burns and others even became paralyzed
after having moved the wastes from the ship into the harbor." Ultimately Italy agreed to
remove the waste and the Italian Cabinet adopted a decree that banned waste exports to
developing countries. 23 Italy accepted the waste on its own territory but only after the
refusal by many other European countries to do so, and despite a strike of 1,400 Italian
port workers who discovered that toxins were leaking from the ship. 24
Another notorious example is 'the world tour' of the Khian Sea vessel. The ship left in
1986 from Philadelphia with more than 14,000 tons of municipal waste and arrived two
years later in Singapore with a totally empty load, despite the fact that none of the
countries on any of the continents had accepted it." It was suspected that the cargo was
dumped illegally in the Indian Ocean, even though the captain denied to have done so (but
he also refused to say where he had unloaded the cargo). 26 A response by the
international community to the complex problem of the movement of hazardous wastes
can be found in the Basel Convention of I989. 27
It should be stressed that other international agreements concerning certain aspects
of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste prior to the creation of the Basel
Convention existed, albeit with a more restricted scope and number of participating
members. 28 In 1984 Members of the OECD had adopted a "Movement Decision" related
n
Id., at 132.
13
Id., at 133.
M
Id., at 134.
u
Julienne I. Adler, United States ' Waste Export Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors in Garbage,
40 AM U. L. REV. 885, 886-887 (1991); Okani, supra note 7, at 157.
26 Okaru, supra note 7, at 158.
"Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989); or at <http:/Avww.unhip.ch/basil/baselcon.htm> (open for signature
March 22, 1989) (hereinafter Basel Convention).
"The regional European response will be analyzed more extensively below, at pages 37-56.
7to the shipments of hazardous wastes among themselves29 and expanded it in 1986 to non-
members in their "Export Decision". 30 Yet, both OECD Decisions have been criticized for
their vague terms and 'liberal' regulation. 31 Also, many conventions related to the
dumping of wastes at sea prevailed previously. 32 But, the Basel Convention became the
first Convention to favor a "transsectoral approach" by focusing on the pollutants rather
than on particular environmental segments (as marine environment, continental waters,
atmosphere...). 33 Some go as far as to declare that the Basel Convention is "the most
binding, restrictive international provision regulating the transfontier movement of
hazardous waste". 34 To comprehend that statement, a careful examination of the Basel
Convention is required.
29OECD Council Decision and Recommendation on Transfontier Movements of Hazardous Waste, Feb.l,
1984, OECD C(83)180 (Final), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984), Annex, par. 1. (Australia and Greece
abstained).
30OECD Council Decision and Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area,
June 5, 1986, OECD C(86) 64 (Final), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986) (Australia abstained).
31 See Vu, supra note 6, at 404-406 (analysis of both OECD Decisions); See Kate Sinding, The
Transboundary Movement of Waste: a Critical Comparison of U.S. Interstate Policy and the Emerging
International Regime, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 796, 804-805 (1996) (analysis of the OECD Decisions;
finding one binding term: "that member countries control the transfontier movements of hazardous waste
and inform other members of such movements").
32 See Murphy, supra note 8, at 33 (reference made to the adoption of a technical annex to the MARPOL
Convention by the International Maritime Organization in order to address pollution from the carriage of
hazardous wastes by sea); See Alexandre Kiss, Transboundary Movement of Waste, 26 TEXAS INTL
LAW JOURNAL 522- 528 (1991) (thorough analysis of the Oslo Convention of 1972, the Helsinki
Convention of 1974, the Barcelona Convention of 1976, the London Dumping Convention of 1979 and
the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention of 1982/
"Kiss, supra note 32, at 528.
M William N. Doyle, United States Implementation ofthe Basel Convention: Time Keeps Ticking, Ticking
Away..., 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 141, 143 (1995).
C. The shaping of the Basel Convention
The two examples mentioned previously and many more "toxic cargoes"
incidents35 led to a public and political awareness demanding a comprehensive and binding
international approach. In 1987, the Governing Council of the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP)36 adopted the "Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes", 37 through which it sought to
assist developing countries in installing a 'cradle-to-grave' 38 disposal system of hazardous
wastes.
39
The key principles of the Cairo Guidelines are: 40
1.) States should minimize transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
2.) States should ensure that exported wastes are not subjected to less stringent standards
than the wastes retained in its borders.
3.) States should seek and offer international cooperation in the development and
promotion of control technologies for environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes.
4.) States should pursue pollution minimization techniques through appropriate treatment
methods.
15 See Hackett, supra note 1, at 296-297 (summary and reference to many other hazardous and toxic waste
cases).
"Robert M. Rosenthal, Ratification of the Basel Convention: Why the United States Should Adopt the No
Less Environmentally Sound Standard, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 61, 71 (1992) ( In 1972, at
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, delegates created the UNEP).
" U.N. Env. Progr., Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of
Hazardous Wastes, 1987, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC, 14/33 (hereinafter Cairo Guidelines).
18 Sundram, supra note 14, at 9.
19 Jason L. Gudofsky, Transboundary Shipments ofHazardous Waste for Recycling and Recovery
Operations, 34 STAN. J. INTL L. 219, 224 (1998) (this was the result of a working group set up under
the auspices of UNEP in 1982).
40 Sundram, supra note 14, at 10.
The Cairo Guidelines opened the international debate on regulatory schemes
between States even further, and made the chances of the success of a binding 1" legal
instrument more plausible. 42 After about two years of negotiations the Basel
Convention 43 was signed on March 22, 1989, by 35 countries and the European
Commission out of the 1 16 participating countries,44 during the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes, held in Basel, Switzerland. 45 On May 6, 1992, 40 the Basel
Convention entered intoforce 90 days after the deposition of the twentieth ratification. 47
41 Mark Bradford, The United States, China & the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 305, 315 (1997).
42 Sundram, supra note 14 at 10.
43 See Basel Convention, supra note 27.
44 Press Release: Basel Meeting on Hazardous Wastes Ends on Note ofOptimism,
<http://www.unhip.ch/basil/sbc/pr2-98a.htm> (visited on Nov. 3,1998) (hereinafter Press Release: Basel
Ends on Note ofOptimism); Press Release: Progress, supra note 7 (to this date 117 States and the
European Community are Contracting Parties); For an extensive list of the status of all the signatories see
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/fin...les/part_boo/xxviiboo/xxvii_3.html (hereinafter www. un.org).
45 William Schneider, The Basel Convention Ban on Hazardous Waste Exports: Paradigm ofEfficacy or
Exercise in Futility ?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 247, n.10 (1996) (Basel, Switzerland,' was a
symbolic convention site after a major chemical spill of approximately 1,000 tons of chemicals and organic
compounds contaminated the Rhine river causing an ecological disaster).
44 See www.un.org, supra note 44.
47 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 25; Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 72 (quoting Dr.Tolba,
Executive Director of UNEP, whom "explained that the number of ratifications required was kept
deliberately low so that the treaty could quickly become international law".).
Chapter II.
Analysis and Criticism of the Basel Convention :
A .Goals of the Basel Convention :
The main objectives of the Convention are: 48
1.) To reduce transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes to a
minimum consistent with their environmentally sound management. 49
2.) To treat and dispose of hazardous wastes and other wastes as close as possible to
their source of generation in an environmentally sound manner. 50
3.) To minimize the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes (in terms of both
quantity and potential hazard). 51
48 See Manualfor the Implementation ofthe Basel Convention,
<http://www.unhip.ch/basil/sbc/workdoc/mamial.htm> (hereinafter Manual) (The Manual aims at assisting
Parties as well as non-Parties, the private sector, NGOs, and individuals to understand the obligations set
forth in the Convention; it explains the provisions of the Convention in simple language and gives
examples of situations covered by the Convention).
49 See the Basel Convention, supra note 27, at par. 10, 18 and 23.
50
Id, Preamble at par. 8.
51
Id., Preamble at par. 3 and 17.
10
11
B. Important concepts and definitions^2
\.) hazardous wastes and other wastes
hazardous wastes
Wastes shall be considered as "hazardous waste" if
:
a.) They belong to any listed category (in Annex I), unless they do not possess
any of the characteristics contained in Annex HI, such as explosive, flammable,
corrosive..." The author Vu points out that a list of wastes to be monitored encompasses
more items than a list of wastes to be banned, "both because it is easier to implement and
because industry will be less likely to oppose mere monitoring". 54 Nevertheless the
problem with making finite lists is that they can never be complete. 55
b.) They are defined as, or are considered to be hazardous wastes by the domestic
legislation of the Party of Export, Import or Transit. This flexible definition allows an
environmentally conscious country to include more wastes in the hazardous category but
might also weaken the enforcement of international transactions in areas where countries
"Some definitions will not be treated, thus transboundary movement, competent authority, state of export,
state of import, state of transit, states concerned, person, exporter, generator,...are all defined in art. 2 of
the Basel Convention.
53 Annex I of the Convention provides for a list of 45 categories of wastes divided into two distinct
categories: first category comprising waste streams (e.g. clinical wastes, waste mineral PCB, etc..) and a
second category comprising wastes having as constituents certain enumerated substances such as copper
compounds, arsenic, cadmium, lead, organic cyanides, etc... The Basel Convention, supra note 27, at
Annex I; Annex III lists 14 classes of hazardous characteristics and each hazard class of the Convention also
corresponds to hazard classification 1 to 9 of the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of
Hazardous Goods. The Basel Convention, supra note 27, at Annex III. See also Sundram, supra note 14,
at n. 46The concept of hazardous waste will be covered further infra, at page 22.
M Vu, supra note 6, at 413.
55
Ibid.
12
involved in a same transboundary shipment use very different definitions, or have little or
no national environmental legislation. 36
* other wastes and wastes not covered bv the Convention
Household wastes and incinerator ash from household wastes shall be considered as other
wastes, subject to the regime of the Basel Convention. 57 By contrast, radioactive wastes
and wastes which are derived from the normal operations of a ship are excluded from the
scope of the Basel Convention, since they are governed by other international
instruments. 58
The Basel Convention does not specify what concentration of hazardous materials
would make the waste hazardous. This will both allow a "political and scientific
evolution of the definition of hazardous waste" 59 but will also render the calibration of
hazardousness more difficult and therefore hinder proper implementation of the
Convention to a certain extent. 60
2.) environmentally sound management
:
Mr. Sundram writes evocatively that if one "considers the heart of the Convention
to be the control of the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, then its soul is the
56
Id., at 413-414; Yet art. 6, par. 5 (a), (b), (c) of the Basel Convention, see supra note 27, proposes some
solutions if only one of the countries involved in a transboundary movement considers a substance as
hazardous waste; See B. John Ovink, Transboundary Shipments ofHazardous Wastes: the Basel and
Bamako Conventions: Do Third World Countries Have A Choice?, 13 DICK. J. INTL L. 281, 291
(1995).
57 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 1 par. 2 and Annex U.
s
* Id., art. 1 par. 3 and par. 4.
59 Okaru, supra note 7, at 144; Bradford, supra note 41, at 316.
60 Vu, supra note 6, at 418, n 169 (the author describes the proverbial "cry wolf' problem when regulations
become applicable as soon as a mere trace of hazardous substance is found, often rendering the control of
true hazardous waste perfunctory).
13
disposal of hazardous wastes in an environmentally sound manner" ," Article 2 defines
environmentally sound management as "taking all practicable steps to ensure that
hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in a manner which will protect human
health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such
wastes"." The Convention further clarifies that member states need to take the
appropriate measures to reduce the generation of hazardous wastes and other wastes to a
minimum and to ensure the availability of adequate disposalfacilities 6i Additionally,
parties are expected to require that hazardous wastes and other wastes subject to the
transboundary movement be packaged , labeled and transported in conformity with
generally accepted and recognized international rules and standards. 64
This broad definition has been criticized for its vague terms. 65 Over the years though,
technical working groups have developed "technical guidelines" which contain essential
information to familiarize the parties to the Convention with the minimum 'Basel
standards' to be taken into consideration (e.g. guidelines regarding incineration on land,
specially engineered landfills, waste oils from petroleum origins and sources...). 66
An illustration of the importance of a clear definition lies in the obligation that rests on
each party to the Convention not to allow the export of hazardous wastes or other wastes
if it has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an
61 Sundram, supra note 14, at 13.
62 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 2 par. 8.
61
Id., art. 4 par. 2(a)-(b).
64
Id., art. 4 par. 7(b).
65 Katharine Kummer, The International Regulation of Transboundary Traffic in Hazardous Wastes: the
1989 Basel Convention, 41 INTL & COMP. L. Q. 530, 560-561 (1992).
66 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4 par. 8 (requiring the Parties to adopt technical guidelines
from their first meeting on). See generally Basel Convention Technical Guidelines (Oct. 25, 1994)
<http://ww\v.unhip.ch/sbc/guidehnes.html>. See Sundram, supra note 14, at 14 (giving detailed references
to all the existing technical guidelines).
14
environmentally sound manner 67 Mr. Ovink therefore ascribes the absence of a
comprehensive definition of 'environmentally sound management' to the obstruction by
certain industrialized nations that fear having to dispose of their hazardous waste at home
since they have comparatively better management schemes in their own country. 6*
3.) determining whether to allow a transboundarv movement
a.) the general principle of a limited ban
Typical for the Convention's mechanism is that "any State has the sovereign right
to ban the entry or disposal of foreign hazardous wastes and other wastes in its
territory".
69
This includes the right of the transit country to ban the import of hazardous
wastes and other wastes if it has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be
managed in an environmentally sound manner". 10 Above all, the Parties should not permit
hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported or imported from a non-Party. 11 This
latter provision is also known as the 'limited ban 7 . Its intention is to prohibit States
trading with States that are "not willing or not able to meet the basic standards of the
Convention" and also to spur the non-parties to ratify the Convention. 72 Originally, the
OECD members that signed the Basel Convention were successful in avoiding a total ban
on the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. 73
67 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4 par. 2(e); art.4 par. 10 specifies that this obligation of
waste-generating States "may not under any circumstances be transferred to the States of import and
transit".
" Ovink, supra note 56, at 292.
69
Id., Preamble par. 6 and art. 4 par. 1, (emphasis added).
70
Id., art. 4 par. 2(g).
71
Id., art. 4 par. 5.
72
Bradford, supra note 41, at 320.
75
Ibid.
15
Another success for the OECD members 74 was the insertion of article 1 1, which
allows Party-states to "enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or
arrangements regarding transboundary movement of hazardous wastes with Parties or
non-Parties provided that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from the
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes (...), these agreements or
arrangements shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than
those provided for by this Convention (...) in particular taking into account the interests
of developing countries". 75 Despite those last soothing words, almost all members of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)76 initially refused to sign the final Convention
document, since they believed this latter provision to be a back-door to the terms of the
'limited ban'.
77
b.) prior informed consent
The procedure of prior informed consent was strongly supported by
"industrialized nations, particularly the United States, as a practical alternative to a total
ban on transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes". 78 Article 6 of the Basel
Convention provides that "the State ofExport shall notify, or shall require the generator or
exporter to notify, (...), the competent authority of the States concerned of any proposed
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes". 79 Subsequently, the
74
Ibid.
75 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 11 par. 1.
16 Bradford, supra note 41, at 321 (all members of the OAU, except Nigeria originally refused to sign the
final document).
77
Liu, supra note 10, at 143 (environmentalists denounced this provision as a loophole).
7S
Bradford, supra note 41, at 318; See also Okaru, supra note 7, at 154.
79 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art 6 par. 1 (emphasis added).
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State ofImport shall (while not being subjected to any deadline)
80
and each State of Transit
which is a Party may (within 60 days after notification) respond to the notifier in
writing81 or without conditions, deny permission for the movement The concerned
Parties can consent to the movement or request additional information.
92 Even when the
State of Import has not prohibited the import of hazardous wastes and other wastes, the
Parties should prohibit or should not permit the export of such wastes without the written
consent of the State ofImport to the specific import Additionally, the Exporting State
shall not allow the generator or exporter to commence the transboundary movement until
it has received written confirmation that the generator or exporter have received from the
State of Import: i) a written confirmation and ii) a confirmation of the existence of a
contract between the exporter and the disposer, specifying environmentally sound
management of the wastes in question. 83
A detailed tracking system is installed by obliging each Party to require that
hazardous wastes and other wastes be accompanied by a movement document from the
point at which the transboundary movement commences to the point of disposal. 84
The State of Export may, after the written consent of the States concerned, allow the
generator or the exporter to use a general notification for shipments of the same type via
the same route
85 during a maximum period of 12 months after given consent. 80
10
Id., art. 6, par. 2 .
Id., art 6, par. 4.
R
Id., art. 6, par. 2 and par. 4.
'The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 6 par. 3.
u
Id., art4 par. 7(c), see also art. 6 par. 9 (obliging the Parties to ensure that each person who takes charge
of the transboundary movement signs the document either upon delivery or receipt of the wastes in
question). The necessary content of the movement document can be found in Annex V, A and B.
M
Id., art. 6 par. 6.
" Id., art. 6 par. 8.
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The only substantive remedy*7 of the Basel Convention is the duty to re-import,
which rests on the Exporting State if a transboundary movement cannot be completed in
accordance with the terms of the contract, and if no alternative arrangements can be made
for disposal in an environmentally sound manner. 88
c/> miscellaneous provisions :
An additional safety net is formed by the requirement that any transboundary
movement of hazardous or other wastes shall be covered by an insurance, bond or other
guarantee as may be required by the State of import or any State of transit which is a
party.
89
Article 9 of the Basel Convention briefly enumerates the situations where traffic
shall be deemed illegal and requires each Party to introduce appropriate national/domestic
legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic.90
An annual report from the Parties containing information regarding transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes or other wastes in which they have been involved has
been made obligatory. 91
At this stage the Dispute Settlement between Parties still relies on 'classical'
means of negotiation or "any other peaceful means of their own choice". 92 In the event
Parties fail to settle, the dispute may by common agreement be submitted to the ICJ or to
87
Bradford, supra note 41, at 319.
" The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 9 par. 3.
"Id, art. 6, par. 11.
90
Id., art. 9 par. 1-5.
" Id., art. 13 par. 3 (giving further details as to which information is requested).
91
Id., art. 20 par. 1.
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arbitration.
93 Not surprisingly, the Dispute Settlement clause has been criticized for not
offering enough compliance and enforceability guarantees. 94 First, is the absence in the
Convention of a. compulsory adjudication system, unless the Parties involved have given
their consent to rely on the ICJs jurisdiction. 95 Second, the ICJ only offers standing to
States and not to NGOs nor individuals. 96 Some authors used to believe that even if the
ICJ retains jurisdiction over a dispute, it would still lack the necessary expertise in
environmental matters. 97 However, in 1993 a specialized 'ICJ Environmental Chamber'
was created, but so far no case has ever been brought to it. 98
C. The adoption of a complete ban
\.) outside the Basel Convention
The dissatisfaction of many developing countries with being treated as a dumping
destination of Western waste, prior to the insertion of a complete ban in the Convention, 99
93
Id., art. 20 par. 2.
94 See Hackett, supra note 1, at 319-320.
Harvard Law Review Association (HLRA), Assent to and Enforcement ofInternational Environmental
Agreements, 104 HARV.L.REV. 1550, 1563 (1991); Schneider, supra note 45, at 282; Vu, supra note 6,
at 420.
96 HLRA, supra note 90, at 1562. Comparatively, it should be mentioned that the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has recently decided that environmental organizations do not have legal standing, see C-
321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Commission (2 April 1998). The Council has recently
welcomed the proposal by the Commission to provide private individuals and environmental organizations
access to justice, but the Commission has so far not submitted a related report that the Council requested.
See Rod Hunter and Koen Muylle, European Community Environmental Law: Institutions, Law Making,
Enforcement, and Free Trade, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10477, 10488 and n.123 (1998) (referring to Council
Resolution of October 7, 1997 on the Drafting, Implementation, and Enforcement of Community
Environmental Law, 1997 O.J. (C 321).
97
Ibid.; Schneider, supra note 45, at 282.
98
Latest information received through e-mail on 23 March 1999. See information@Jcj-cij.org.
99
It was only after the Parties of the Basel Convention had decided to ban the hazardous waste trade from
OECD to non-OECD States that many developing countries ratified it. See The Basel Convention - What
Is It All About? (Feb., 1998) <http:www.greenbase.gl3/gopher/campaigns/toxins/1998/baswhat.txt>.
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led the OAU in 1991 to adopt the "Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import into
Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within Africa", 100 banning all waste imports into Africa, 101 and installing a prior
informed consent mechanism among the African States. 102 For at the time even the Chief
Economist of the World Bank, Lawrence Summers, dared to declare that "the economic
logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and
we should face up to that (...) underpopulated countries such as Africa are vastly under-
polluted".
103 The African countries are not alone in their "outcry to stop environmental
terrorism".
104
Recently, six other regions have either called for or concluded regional
agreements banning the import of hazardous wastes. 105 Most notable among these are the
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention ofLome 106 (Lome IV) and the Central American Regional
Agreement on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 107 ('Panama City'). 108
100 Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement
and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991);
Ovink, supra note 56, at n.6 (However, the Bamako Convention has not entered into force because it has
not been ratified by 10 countries).
101
Id., art. 2, par. 1(d) and paras. 2-3.
102
Id., art. 4, par. 3(i)-(u); For a more extensive analysis see: Ovink, supra note 56, at 281-295; Schneider,
supra note 45, at 262-263; C. Russel H. Shearer, Comparative Analysis ofthe Basel and Bamako
Conventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL.L.141, 179 (1993) (describing how one of the major
weaknesses of the Bamako Convention is that it has not entered into force so far, and that there's no
provision for its interim application).
103 Greenpeace International, International Trade in Wastes (June 1997)
<http:/Avww.greenbase.gl3/gopher/campaigns/toxins/1997/es2basel.L\t>.
104 Ovink, supra note 56, at 282-283.
105
Id., n.9 (including the Association of South East Asian Nations' Interparliamentary Organization, the
South Pacific Forum, the South East Pacific Coastal States of Latin America, and the U.N. Economic
Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean).
106 Fourth Convention of Lome, Dec. 15, 1989, ACP-EEC, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47, 29 I.L.M. 783.
107 Acuerdo Regional Sobre Movimiento Transfrontiero de Desechos Peligrosos (Central American
Regional Agreement on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes), Dec. 9-11, 1992, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CHW/C.1/TNF.2 (Oct. 1993), available in 3 Y.B. INTL ENVTL.L., 1992, Doc.No. 10.
"" See Bradford
,
supra note 41, at 321-322, and n. 71 and n. 72 (extensive analysis).
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2.) within the Basel Convention :
From the start the Basel Convention recognized the "increasing desire for the
prohibition of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal in other
States, especially developing countries (...)". 109 The Conferences of the Parties (COPs),
meeting at regular intervals,' 10 proved to be fruitful occasions to elaborate those intentions.
The signatories of the Basel Convention adopted a. decision" 1 during the Second COP
meeting (COP-2), held in March 1994, to place a total ban on the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes and other wastesfrom OECD-members to non OECD-
members and to phase out similar exports destined for recycling or recovery operations,
before banning them completely on 31 December 1997.
"
2
Some say that the resounding vote in favor of the ban was a result of a lobbying
campaign of Greenpeace." 3 Almost by retaliation the International Reclamation Bureau (a
global recycling business association), proposed to set up a "fighting fund" of $250,000
109 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, Preamble, par. 7, see also: art. 15, par. 7 and art. 4, par .2(e).
110
Id., art. 15, par.l (obliging the Parties to do so). The first meeting was held in Piriapolis, Uruguay on 4
December 1992, see extensively: <http://www.unWp.ch/sbc/cop-l.html>.
'" See Diana L. Godwin, The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements ofHazardous Wastes:
An Opportunityfor Industrialized Nations to Clean Up their Acts?, 22 DENV.J.INTL L. & POL'Y 193,
204 (1993) (reporting how Denmark was the 'driving force' behind the decision, while Germany and the
U.K. "vehemently opposed" it); See Bradford, supra note 41, at 334 (informing that China was a major
proponent as well); Jim Puckett, Comment on the Basel Convention, at:
<www.greenpeace.org/home/gopher/campaigns/toxios/1994 basclo txt> (In 1994 seven countries opposed
the ban: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S., i.e. "the Sinister Seven"); Narelle
Hooper, Industry Outfoxed on Waste Trade, BUS. REV. WKLY., May 9, 1994, at 30 ( "Australia was
isolated, one of only three countries voting against the decision while 63 voted in favor (...) Australia later
bowed to the inevitable and supported the decision").
112 See Press Release: Ministers Debate Amending the Basel Convention to Ban Hazardous Waste Exports
to Non-OECD Countries (hereinafter Ministers Debate) <http://www.unhip.ch/basil/sbc/pr9-95.htm>;
Extensively at: <http://www.unhip.dh/basil/sbc/cop-2.html>.
113 Hooper, supra note 111.
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for legal costs to challenge the Basel definition of scraps and residues as 'waste', during a
meeting in Barcelona in 1994. 1M
During the Third COP meeting (COP-3), held in September 1995, the Parties
ratified the decision of COP-2 by adopting an amendment"'' to the Basel Convention." 6
So far, the ban has not entered intoforce yet," 7 since the necessary amount of ratifications
have not been deposited." 8 Replying to the major claim of the Parties opposing the ban,
especially Canada and Australia," 9 COP-3 decided to delegate a technical working group
with the duty to clarify which wastes will be subjected to the ban 12 ° Greenpeace saw in
this request for redefinition a maneuver from industrialized countries to de-categorize
wastes for recycling as non-wastes and to de-list hazardous wastes as those meant for
recycling. 121
One of the main decisions during the Fourth meeting of the Parties (COP-4) in
February 1998, involved the establishment of two hazardous wastes lists :
- A.) The Hazardous List: proposing to ban the export of wastes containing certain
114 Jim Puckett, The Basel Ban: Threats and Implementation, 7.1 Toxic Trade Update (Aug. 3, 1994)
<http:www.greenbase.gl 3/gopher/campaigns/toxins/l 994/basba3 .txt>.
'"The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 17, par. 3: "The Parties shall make every effort to reach
agreement on any proposed amendment to this Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have
been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-
fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting, and shall be submitted by the
Depositary to all Parties for ratification, approval, formal confirmation or acceptance".
116 See also Sundram, supra note 14, at 19.
117 Press Release: Basel Ends on Note ofOptimism, supra note 44 (The amendment has so far been ratified
by Denmark, the EU, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.). See also www.un.org., supra
note 44.
'" The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 17, par. 5: "(...) Amendments adopted in accordance with
paragraphs 3 or 4 above shall enter into force between Parties having accepted them on the ninetieth day
after the receipt by the Depositary of their instrument of ratification, approval, formal confirmation or
acceptance by at least three-fourths of the Parties who accepted the amendments to the protocol concerned
(•••)".
119 Sundram, supra note 14, at 21.
120 Press Release: Ministers Debate, supra note 1 12.
121 See Puckett, supra note 114.
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chemicals and substances such as lead, mercury, asbestos...
- B.) The Non-Hazardous List: exempting from the ban those wastes that can safely (and
profitably) be recycled or reused, including scrap iron, steel or copper, paper... 1"
D. Criticism of the Basel Convention
\.) critique of the Basel Ban in particular
Probably the most prevalent fear is that many countries will not comply with the
ban and that illegal trading will be common. 123 For it has to be said that, even though the
secretive nature of illegal traffic obstructs the gathering of detailed information, 124 waste
traders have the advantage of earning fabulous profits without the risk of drug or gun
smuggling. 125 Research done by Greenpeace indeed indicates that waste trade business is
proliferating in the 1990s.
126
Some also consider the OECD/non-OECD distinction as an "imperfect
equation", 127 for various reasons. First, it increases the chances that less affluent OECD-
members, such as Mexico and Turkey, will become new "waste havens" unless those
122 Press Release: Basel Ends on Note ofOptimism, supra note 44; See Sundram , supra note 14, at 22.
121 Bradford, supra note 41, at 314-315; Valin, supra note 4, at 285-286; Okaru, supra note 7, at 152; Liu,
supra note 10, at 126; Michelle M. Vilcheck, The Controls on the Transfontier Movement ofHazardous
Wastesfrom Developed to Developing Nations: The Goal ofa "Level Plaving Field", 1 1 NW. J.INTL L.
& BUS. 643, 671 (1991).
IM Valin, supra note 4, at 285-286; Bradford, supra note 41, at 315; Press Release: Ministers in Malaysia,
supra note 2 (to date, there is an existing cooperation with Interpol and the World Customs
Organization).
m
Liu, supra note 10, at 126.
124 See Puckett supra note 1 1 1 (Since 1989, more than 500 attempts to export over 200 million tons of
waste, from OECD to non-OECD countries have been cataloged); Mark A. Montgomery, Banning Waste
Exports: Much Ado About Nothing, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 197, 201-202 (1994) (mentioning that
Greenpeace is the most widely cited source of information about international waste transfers, because
UNEP does not yet collect waste trade data of its own, and the Basel Secretariat does not make its
statistics publicly available. The author gives a list of reliable data information in n. 26).
127
Ibid.
23
nations enact national law banning the import of hazardous wastes, 128 in all circum-
stances.
129
Second, newly industrialized, non-OECD members will take over the role
played by the OECD countries prior to the ban. 130 Countries such as Australia and the
United States (both mere signatories to the Basel Convention up to this date) have
already declared that they will sign bilateral agreements with non-OECD members, even
after the ban comes into effect. 131 For example, in 1994 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
published a document in which it advised the U.S. companies currently exporting
commodities to non-OECD countries to inform their clients "that such a shipment may
have to cease December 31, 1997, unless an appropriate bilateral agreement is concluded
between the U.S. and the receiving country". 132 Jim Puckett perceives this industry
strategy as a flagrant attempt to call upon non-OECD Basel Parties to violate the Basel
ban decision by deliberately spreading misinformation that bilaterals are legally acceptable
ways to circumvent the ban. 133 An increasing concern is whether developing nations may
adopt national policies which choose to ignore or circumvent the ban with bilateral
agreements entered into with OECD countries. 134
128
Ibid.
129 See for a general analysis for Mexico: Luis R. Vera-Morales, Dumping in the International Backyard:
Exportation ofHazardous Wastes to Mexico, 7 TUL.ENV.L.J. 353, 355 (1994) (Mexican legislation
prohibits any import of hazardous waste into Mexico for the purpose of storage, destruction or final
disposal, but it still enters the country as intended for recycling or as a raw material), Stephen M. Learner,
The Maquiladoras and Hazardous Waste: the Effect Under NAFTA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 255 (1993).
130
Schneider, supra note 45, at 287.
131
Id., at a 166.
132S See Puckett, supra note 1 14 (emphasis added).
133
Ibid.
134 Schneider, supra note 45, at 286-287.
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The major opposing forces to the ban can be found among the recycling
industries.
135 Apart from the interests of the 'Western Industries', 13" some developing
countries claim that the ban on imports of recyclable wastes will seriously harm their
economies and in particular block the necessary income to flow to them, thereby
obstructing the installation of sound management practices and technology transfer
possibilities.
137
2.) commentary on the Convention in general
As demonstrated above, the Convention is tainted by potential loopholes, vague
definitions and an inadequate enforcement mechanism. But I would like to concur with
Mark Montgomery's moderating tone, when writing that those criticisms, "although
justifiable, are neither surprising nor unique", since inadequate enforcement mechanisms
are inherent to international law. 138
A problem that is currently being addressed is the introduction of a liability and
compensation mechanism in the Basel Convention. An ad hoc working group of legal and
technical experts gathered in Geneva in order to prepare a draft protocol on liability and
compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes and their disposal. The protocol is likely to be adopted during the COP-5 to be
held in December 1999. 139 It is hoped that a liability provision for the generators of
135
Valin, supra note 4, 280-286; Puckett, supra note 111; Kratz, supra note 11, at 336-342.
136 See Valin, supra note 4, at 280 (" Industry claims that the ban on trading recycled wastes between
OECD and developing countries could cost the U.S. industry $2,2 billion a year in commodities trade").
137
Id., at 284-285; Elli Louka, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International Environmental Law is Not
Only About the Protection of the Environment, 10 TEMP. INTL & COMP. L. J. 79, 88 (1996).
138 Montgomery, supra note 126, at 199.
139 The COP-5 meeting was originally planned to be held December 1998. The result of the ad hoc working
group held from 19-23 April 1999, is available at: <http://www.unhip.ch/basu7sbc/Uab9-2.hun>. Some
gray areas relating to scope, the level of compensation, and emergency funds will be discussed during a
working group meeting at the end of August 1999. See: <http://www.ends.co.uk/envdaily> (April 27,
1999).
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hazardous wastes will increase the implementation of the Basel Convention by the
citizens of Basel parties and work as an incentive to reduce the generation of those wastes
domestically."10
An indirect criticism on the reach of the Basel Convention can be found in a recent
'hazardous cargo' incident which arose 1 "" between Cambodia and Taiwan, both non-
Members of the Basel Convention. 142 In December 1998 Cambodian authorities
discovered over 3,000 tons of mercury-tainted waste illegally dumped near the popular
coastal resort of Sihanoukville by the Taiwanese petrochemical giant Formosa Plastics.
Its discovery caused thousands of residents to riot and flee the province and four people
died in the melee. 143 Allegedly two dock workers whom handled the toxic waste 144 and
several villagers living near the dump also died. 145 Formosa Plastics signed an agreement
with the Cambodian government to remove the waste, but has not found a disposal site
yet. Originally the waste was to be disposed in West Moreland, California, but the plan
was abandoned after the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reviewed its
original approval under public pressure and allegations that the toxicity exceeded EPA's
140 Greenpeace International, COP4 The Key Issues At a Glance (Feb. 1998)
<http://www.greenpeace.gl3/gopher/campaignsAoxins/1998/cop4key.txt>; Stephen Johnson, The Basel
Convention: The Shape ofThings to Come for United States Waste Exports?, 21 ENVTL.L. 299, at 316-
317(1991).
141 Another example of a toxic cargo incident can be found at: Indian Unions, Greenpeace: Toxic Ship
Sneaked In (March 20, 1999) <http://ens.lycos.com/ens/mar99/1999L-03-22-01.html> (At the end of May
Greenpeace and trade unions of India charged an Anglo-Dutch shipping company, P&O Neddloyd, with
exporting hazardous wastes, including ships-for-scrap, to India, in violation of a ruling of India's highest
court); See for many more current examples <http://www.banorg> (especially the news section of this
Basel Action Network web site), and <http://greenpeace.org/toxins.html>.
142 See www.unorg, supra note 44 (updated list of Parties to the Basel Convention).
143 Cambodia Investigates New Waste Dump (Dec. 24, 1998) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-
pacific/newsid_24 1000/24 1 86 1 .stm.
144 Cambodia Says Farewell to Toxic Waste (Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/news/newsdetail.cfm?NewsID=6879.
145 Accord Signed to Remove Taiwanese Waste From Cambodia (Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/engUsh/world/asia-pacific>.
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safe-storage level.
146
In the meanwhile the Taiwanese port officials did not allow the ship
that contains the removed wastes at stake to dock, and there is a growing fear that
Formosa Plastics will be unable to find a country willing to take the toxic material. 147
More sadly is the Cambodian government's apparent reluctance to pursue any legal
action against Formosa Plastics, which has apologized, but has refused to accept
responsibility or pay compensation. 148 There are allegations that up to three million
dollars in bribes may have been paid to corrupt government officials, and at this stage
three of them have been charged with endangering human life, property and the
environment under Cambodian law. 149
E. U.S. versus Basel :
1. friend or. ...
Although the United States was one of the first nations to sign the Basel
Convention in 1990, 150 its ratification process has not been completed yet. 151 The Senate
did give its prerequisite Advise and Consent to the ratification of the Basel Convention in
August 1992, 152 but the necessary implementing legislation has not been passed. 153 The
146 Cambodia Sends Toxic Waste Back Home (Apr. 2, 1999) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-
pacific/newsid_3 10000/3 10362.stm>.
147 Taiwan Toxic Waste Waits (Apr. 8, 1999) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/lu/english/world/asia-pacific>.
148 Cambodia Sends Toxic Waste Back Home, supra note 146.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.; See also Rebecca A. Kirby, The Basel Convention and the Needfor United States
Implementation, 24 GA. J. INTL & COMP.L .REV. 281-282 (1994).
131 Kirby, supra note 150, at 282; Paul E. Hagan, International and United States Controls on
Transboundary Shipments ofHazardous Wastes, C990 ALI-ABA 57, 75 (1995).
132 August 11, 1992, see: 138 Cong. Rec. S. 12, 291 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992).
133 Hagan, supra note 151, at 75; Doyle, supra note 34, 148-155 (detailed overview of U.S. legislative
proposals up to 1995).
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further development of implementing legislation is linked to the amendment of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ('RCRA'). ,M
The Clinton Administration released in February 1994 a "Position Statement on
Basel Legislation" which contained guidelines for Congress in its implementation work. 155
This document
:
"a.) Narrowly defines 'covered wastes' and exempts certain commodity-like secondary
materials such as scrap metal, paper, textiles, and glass when exported for recycling,
b.) Supports an eventual ban on all exports of covered wastes for treatment, storage,
disposal, and recycling except for shipments to Canada and Mexico;
c.) Recommends that the President be given the authority to grant exemptions to the ban
on exports for disposal and recycling based on case-by-case findings". 156
It is important to add that the United States Chamber of Commerce 157 and the
Business Recycling Coalition 158 withdrew their original support to different 'Waste
Export Act Proposals' after the COP-2 accepted the ban on cross boundary waste trade
from OECD to non-OECD members. 159 Ironically, as Mark Bradford remarks, the non-
party status of the US does not prevent it from negotiating bilateral agreements with
party-states of the Basel convention for the import of hazardous wastes (as it has already
done so with Malaysia), 160 since the OECD Recycling Decision, 161 which has been
M Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. art. 6901-6992k; See Doyle, supra note 34, at
154; See Hagan, supra note 151, 75-78.
53 Hagan, supra note 151, at 78.
56
Ibid.
57
Valin, supra note 4, at 287.
" Id., at 283.
59
Id., at 287.
60
Bradford, supra note 41, n. 115.
61 See OECD Recycling Decision, infra note 213.
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integrated in U.S. law,
162
qualifies as a multilateral agreement under the article 1
1
exceptions of the Basel Convention.
1"
2....foe?
a.) the implication of the OECD Recycling Decision for recovery operations
For the sake of clarity, a synopsis will now be given of the American
administrative and legislative approach towards the international movements of hazardous
waste, while the transboundary waste shipments within the U.S.will be covered in
Chapter IV. 164
Pending the complete ratification of the Basel Convention by the United States,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated a final rule that fully
embodies the OECD Recycling Decision, related to shipments of hazardous waste among
OECD countries that are destined for recovery operations; 165 those intended for disposal
or treatment will remain subject to RCRA regulations. 166 The OECD Recycling Decision
(typified by its assignment of wastes in green, amber and red lists) permits member
countries (import, export and transit) to use their national procedures to determine the
162 See Imports and Exports of Hazardous Waste: Implementation of OECD Council Decision, 61 Fed.
Reg. 16, 290 (Apr. 12, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. par. 262.80-89).
163 See supra page 15; Joy Clairmont, Imports and Exports ofHazardous Waste: Implementation ofOECD
Council Decision C(92)39 Concerning the Transfontier Movements ofRecoverable Wastes, 3 ENVTL.
LAW 545, 547 (1997).
164 See infra at pages 58-77.
165 The United States' bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico take precedence over the Rule, see at
61 Fed. Reg. at 16,307.
'" Clairmont, supra note 163, at 545, 548 and n.20-21; See generally 40 C.F.R. pts. 100, 200 and in
particular 40 C.F.R. 262.80(a) (1996) 'recovery operations' are defined as activities leading to resource,
recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct reuse or alternative uses as listed in table 2.B of the Annex of the
OECD Decision, OECD Doc. C(88) 90/Final of 27 May 1988.
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level of control for a particular waste shipment.'
67
This raises obvious problems For
example when only the importing country considers the waste to be hazardous, the
exporting country will be free of all obligations because its national procedures classify
the waste as non-hazardous. 168 A potential conflict that has been overlooked by the
OECD Decision is when only the transit country would define the waste as hazardous,
and not the importing and exporting countries. 169
The concerned countries may subject a transportation to its national procedures
with regard to wastes not yet assigned to the green, amber or red lists by the OECD
Review Mechanism. 170 Thus, if the U.S. national procedures consider an unlisted waste to
be hazardous, it shall be subjected to all the controls imposed on red-list wastes. 171
The OECD Decision leaves it up to the various countries to decide if they want to
require a financial guarantee to back up a possible failure to carry out the shipment as
planned. 172 Currently the United States has not made use of this possibility. 173
Furthermore, the principle of prior informed consent, and an accompanying
tracking document to the movements of hazardous wastes are just like in the Basel
Convention quintessential concepts, and are similarly developed in both systems. 174
The EPA Rule differs from the Basel Convention provisions, by solely resting the
responsibility of the failure to handle the amber- or red-list wastes by the recovery
facility in the hands of the party identified in the contract, and not the exporting
167 See OECD Recycling Decision, infra note 213, at Annex I, section II par. (4) and (5).
16
* Clairmont, supra note 163, at 549.
169
Id., at 550.
170 See OECD Recycling Decision, infra note 213, at Annex I, section II par. (7).
171 See 40 C.F.R. par. 262.82(4)(i), 89(c) (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. at 16,294.
172 See OECD Recycling Decision, infra note 213, at Annex I, section IV par. (1).
173
Clairmont, supra note 163, at 551; see 40 C.F.R. par. 262.85(e) (1996).
174 See OECD Recycling Decision, infra note 213, at respectively Annex I, section IV, par. (2), and Annex
I, App. 2, par. A, B; See more extensively Clairmont, supra note 163, at 553-557.
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country.
175
Therefore, the OECD Decision is not characterized by a duty to re-import by
the exporting country, but rather by a possibility for the responsible party to re-export
the waste to a recovery facility in a different OECD country. 170
bVRCRA Regulations
Section 3001 ofRCRA required EPA to implement means by which to identify
hazardous wastes. The EPA developed two main parameters through which solid wastes
can be considered as hazardous, namely by being listed \n its regulations
177
or by exhibiting
one of four hazardous characteristics (ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, toxicity). 178
The EPA adopted two additional important rules related to the listed wastes, the so-
called 'mixture rule' and the 'derived-from rule', to "prevent generators from evading
hazardous waste regulations by diluting or otherwise changing the composition of listed
waste streams".
179 The mixture rule 1 * provides that any mixture of a listed waste with
another solid waste is itself considered to be a hazardous waste. 181 The derived-from
rulem states that wastes derived from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a listed waste
are deemed to be hazardous wastes. 183 Characteristic wastes on the other hand will be
175 See 40 C.F.R. 262.85(a) (1996); compare with supra note 83.
176
Clairmont, supra note 163, at 557 (referring to 40 C.F.R. 262.82(c)(1) (1996).
177 See 40 C.F.R. pts 261.31 (28) (F), 261.32 (101) (K), 261.33 (186) (P), 261.33(f) (435) (U).
,7
« Respectively, 40 C.F.R. pts. 261.23 (I), 261.21 (C), 261.22 (R), 261.22 (R), 261.24 (T).
179 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER and JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION - LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 235 (Little, Brown &
Company, 2d ed. 1996).
1.0 See 40 C.F.R. par. 261.3(c) (1).
1.1 See clearly PERCIVAL, MILLER, SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 235-237.
1.2 See 40 C.F.R. par. 261.3(c) (2) (i).
'° See clearly PERCIVAL, MILLER, SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 236-237.
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considered hazardous wastes only until they no longer exhibit the hazardous
characteristic.
IM
3 probably both
There are significant differences between the regulation of waste exports as
conceived in the Basel Convention and as installed by RCRA and the EPA Rule. The
most significant ones will be touched upon.
First of all, the Basel Convention and RCRA differ in the scope of waste exports
covered. 185 The Basel Convention encompasses hazardous wastes and other wastes
(household wastes, residues from the incineration of household wastes), 186 while RCRA
only covers hazardous wastes. 187 Above all, the Basel Convention uses a broader
definition of hazardous wastes than RCRA, and while RCRA limits itself to the
regulation of hazardous wastes as defined in the United States, the Basel Convention will
be applicable as soon as any of its parties define it as such in their domestic legislation. 188
Secondly, there is a significant absence under the RCRA requirements and the EPA Rule
of the duty of an exporting country to ensure that the hazardous waste will be managed in
an environmentally sound manner in the the receiving country or elsewhere, and which is
a primordial prerequisite under the Basel Convention. 189 As Mr. Johnson notices, the
importance of the inclusion of such a requirement lays not only in the increased
responsibility of the exporting country for the management of their waste in receiving
184
Id., at 237.
1,5 Johnson, supra note 140, at 312.
1,4 See supra p. 10-11.
1,7 See supra p. 26-27.
'" See supra p. 10; Johnson, supra note 140, at 312-313.
m Compare supra page 11.
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countries, but especially ensures that waste "is not being exported from the country
simply to avoid the high cost of managing the waste in an environmentally sound manner
domestically". 190 Today, EPA lacks the authority to prohibit the export of waste, even if
it knows that the waste will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner. 191
Thirdly, under the Basel Convention the duty to re-import waste if the waste shipment
cannot be completed as agreed upon rests on both the exporter as the exporting country,
while under RCRA only the exporter is obliged to do so. 192
F. Testing the Basel Convention
L) a hypothetical case
If the United States had been a Party to the Basel Convention, a true test for the
Convention might have been launched by China (a full Party State), currently one of the
world's largest importers of hazardous wastes. 193 China announced in November 1995,
that it had blocked the entry of various shipments containing tons of household, medical
and toxic waste illegally shipped from the United States and Canada. In one instance, the
Chinese authorities arrested an American businessman for allegedly shipping 238 tons of
household garbage from California to Shanghai in June 1996, and he was convicted, fined
$60,000 and expelled from the country in 1997. 194 China's National Environmental
190 Johnson, supra note 140, at 314-315.
191
Id., at 315.
192
Ibid.
195 See www.un.org., supra note 44 (China signed the Basel Convention on 22 March 1990, ratified it 17
December 1991 and became a full Party State on May 5, 1992, when die Basel Convention entered into
force); See Bradford, supra note 41, at n. 10 (referring to Greenpeace report estimating that between 1990
and 1993, toxic wastes moving from the United States to China totaled 220,665 metric tons, i.e. twenty
times the combined total for Australia, Canada, Germany and the U.K.).
194
Bradford, supra note 41, at n. 169.
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Protection Agency (PRC-NEPA) particularly claimed it discovered in Qingdao, 640
metric tons of mislabeled 'waste paper' that actually contained medical waste from the
United States. 195 When U.S. government agencies offered to assist in an investigation of
the illegal shipments, the Chinese authorities did not respond and U.S. authorities were
only able to corroborate that one of the shipments contained household waste but could
not verify the hazardous waste claim."6 Nevertheless, the Chinese government announced
a formal protest to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention in May 1996 against the
(alleged) illegal import of hazardous wastes, originating from the United States. 197 As Mr
Bradford infers, it was primarily a public "rhetoric gesture" by China aimed at protesting
against "the negative moral example" rooted in the non-ratification by the U.S. of the
Basel Convention. 198 The importance of China's complaint with the Basel Secretariat lays
more in the fact that a state formally intended to use the venue offered by the Basel
Convention, since no other example is available. As the author observes, the non-Party
status of the United States renders the chances of legal redress within the structures of the
Basel Convention impossible. The Basel dispute resolution provision does not apply to
a party which has not ratified the Convention such as the U.S., unless the disputing
countries have negotiated a separate bilateral treaty. 199
2.) a lost opportunity ?•
In September 1992, amidst the civil war and famine in Somalia, an $80 million
contract between the Somalian Minister of Health, a Swiss company and an Italian waste
195
Id., at 339.
191
Id., at 340.
197
Id., at 308 and 338.
'" Id., at 347-348, see also at 308 (the author reminds us that this conflict arose in a period which was
tainted by the tensions over the respect of American intellectual property rights by China).
199
Id., at 341; See Basel Convention, supra note 27, at art. 20 par. 1, art. 4 par. 5 and art. 1 1 par. 1.
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broker, to dump hazardous waste in Somalia became known to the public. 200 Somalia and
Italy were not parties to the Basel Convention, but Switzerland was
201 Both Italy and
Switzerland promised the Somalian government to investigate the matter further in
conjunction with UNEP. Suspicions quickly arose that the Swiss company was no more
than a front, and UNEP charged "the mafia" with being behind it all Strong international
reactions flared for a moment, but after a month media interest cooled. UNEP claimed
that the international attention over the planned dump had forced the companies to
abandon the venture. 202
The importance of the Somalia incident, as analyzed by author Vu, lies in the
particular loophole of the Basel Convention it depicts. Namely the absence of a
regulatory scheme for the country of the waste broker. More and more waste generators
are relying on waste brokers and other intermediaries, who may be in neither the exporting
nor the importing country. 203 Switzerland, being the only Basel party, cannot be defined
as an exporting nor transit state for the waste neither departed nor passed through its
territory.
20 '1 The author therefore proposes to amend the Basel Convention such as to
monitor waste broker activities. For example, the broker 's country could be considered as
a transit country. This would oblige the waste exporter to obtain a prior informed consent
from the broker's country. There also seems less reason to believe the broker's country
would refuse its consent, since it will not actually suffer pollution by the transport and
200 Vu, supra note 6, at 429-430 and n. 223 (the author also alludes to other hazardous waste dumping
problems between Italy and Somalia and explains the involvement of Italian companies partly by the fact
that Italy ruled Somalia from 1905 to 1960); For extensive references to relevant lecture, see also:
<http://gurukul.ucc.americaaedu/ted7Somalia.htm>.
J01 See www.un.org., supra note 44 (Italy signed the Convention 22 March 1989 and has ratified it in the
meanwhile on 7 Feb. 1994; Switzerland signed 22 March 1989 and ratified it on 31 Jan. 1990).
202 Vu, supra note 6, at 430 (the author cynically adds: "No one even seemed to wonder whether the
traveling business partners had returned to their office")
103
Id., at 432.
204
Id., at 431.
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will gain by its citizen gaining brokerage income.
205 Another alternative would be to
expand the definition of waste exporter10* to include waste broker. The latter would then
be obliged to respect the same environmentally sound manner requirements as a waste
exporter. Parties to the Basel Convention might be more reluctant to adopt this expanded
definition because it would imply a duty to re-import hazardous waste not disposed of in
an environmentally sound manner. 207
205
Id, at 431.
206 The Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 2, par. 15: "Exporter, means any person under the
jurisdiction of the the State of export who arranges for hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported";
see supra page 16 for analysis of the prior informed consent duty resting on the generator and exporter of
hazardous wastes and other wastes.
207 Vu, supra note 6, at 433.
Chapter III.
Actual regulatory scheme in the EIJ. related to the Transboundarv Movement
of Waste
A General background
The "Saga of the Seveso Drums" i.e. the European interstate tension which
originally arose due to the explosion in 1976 of a factory in Seveso, Italy, releasing a cloud
of dioxin and that revived in the early 1980s when barrels of hazardous waste from the
factory were discovered in France, instigated the EU countries to pass the first
Directive208 to regulate the transboundary transport of hazardous wastes in 1984.
Regulation209 259/93 on the "Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste, Within,
Into, and Out of the European Community"210 (Regulation) was adopted in a desire to
208
Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Transfontier
Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 1984 O.J.C.E. (L 326) 31 (1984), amended by Directive 84/63 1/EEC on
the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Transfontier Shipment of Hazardous
Waste, 1986 O.J.C.E. (L 181) 13 (1986); This paper will not cover the legal tension that exists regarding
the proper legal basis for the adoption of waste Directives (art. 130(s) versus art. 100 (a) 4) and its
evolution, see e.g. extensively: Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an
Integrated Market: a Survey ofthe Case Law ofthe United States Supreme Court and the European Court
ofJustice, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 141, 162-177 (1993); for a synopsis: European Newsletter,
Recent Legal Developments ofthe European Community, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 189, 211-2 12
(1994).
209 STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW - THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 136-137 (Penguin Books, U.K., 1995) (" A
Regulation has general application, is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable in all member states.
(...) A Directive does not necessarily apply to all member states and, rather than being directly applicable
in those states, allows them the choice of forms and methods of implementing it in their national laws.
Directives are, however, binding on the member states to which they are addressed as to 'the result to be
achieved'.").
210 Regulation 259/93 on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste, Within, Into and Out of the
European Community, O.J.C.E. (L 30) 36 (1993).
36
37
comply with the Basel Convention 2 " and to end the lax implementation of prior
Directives.
2 ' 2
The Regulation was inspired by:
1.) the third OECD-Decision ('Recycling Decision') of April 19922B - which divides
wastes into three categories by color code, according to the wastes' increased
hazardousness: green, amber, red;
2.) the Belgian Waste Case,
214
rendered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and
3.) the French - German 'medical waste' conflict, 215 all of which will be reviewed below.
2,1 CAROLINE LONDON & MICHAEL LLAMAS, EU LAW ON PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 135 (Ed. Butterworths, U.K. 1995) ("The
Regulation was adopted on Feb.l, 1993; published on Feb.l, 1993; entered into force on Feb. 9, 1993 and
became applicable as from May 6, 1994") and at 62 ("The EU Council approved the Basel Convention on
16 February 1993, one week after the entry into force of Regulation 259/93"), Andrew Evans Skroback,
Even a Sacred Cow Must Live in a Green Pasture: the Proximity Principle, Free Movement ofGoods, and
Regulation 259/93 on Transfontier Waste Shipments Within the EU, 17 BC. INTL & COMP. L. REV.
85, at n.8 (1994).
212
Allen, supra note 17, at 170; See Liu, supra note 10, at 125 and Vu, supra note 6, at n. 101 (in 1989
only Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg had implemented the 1984 and 1986 Directives).
213 Decision of the Council Concerning the Control of Transfontier Movements of Wastes Destined for
Recovery Operations, OECD Council decision Doc. C(92) 39/Final; Transboundary Movements of Toxic
Wastesfor Recovery Covered by New OECD Decision, INTL ENVTL.DAILY (BNA), Apr.22, 1992
(abbreviated as: OECD Recycling Decision):, Sinding, supra note 3 1, at 805 (The Recyclmg Decision of
the OECD was rendered moot for the parties to the Basel Convention, following the COP-3 Decision of
the Convention in Sept. '95).
211 Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium (1992) ECR 1-4431; (1993) I CMLR 365.
514 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 67.
215 See Regulation, supra note 210, art.l, par.1-3. Many authors claim that the the Regulation covers 'all'
types of waste (i.e. in comparison with prior Directives), but considering the important exceptions (see
infra at pages 39-40) I find it a rather confusing language.
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B. Examination of the Regulation
1 scope
The scope of the Regulation encompasses hazardous, household and industrial
waste, but excludes, e.g. radio-active and 'green' waste destined for recovery 2 ' 6 The
'green' waste exception reflects how the EU adopted the three-tiered classification of the
OECD Recycling Decision : green for the non-hazardous wastes; amber for the more
hazardous wastes; red for the most hazardous wastes. 217 The control of transboundary
movement of wastes will vary in accordance to the degree of hazardousness, from a low
level control (green list of wastes: Annex II of the Regulation), to an implicit consent
system, in the absence of an objection by the country in question (amber list of wastes:
Annex III of the Regulation) to an explicit prior written consent scheme (red list of
wastes: Annex IV of the Regulation). 2 ' 8 Greenpeace has reprimanded this "greenwash",
which was a "last minute lobby success" for the manufacturing and recycling industries. 2"
But more importantly, Greenpeace attacks the inclusion of hazardous wastes in the 'green
list'; it being in violation of the Basel Convention. 220
The Commission of the EU has responded to those claims by adapting the
Regulation's Annexes II and III, as follows: "Regardless of whether or not wastes are
included on this list, they may not be moved as green wastes", or respectively "amber
wastes", "if they are contaminated by other materials to an extent which :
a.) increases the risks associated with the waste sufficiently to render it appropriate for
216 See Sinding, supra note 31, at 809; Allen, supra note 17, at 171.
2
" See also LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211, at 142-157; Allen, supra note 17, at 171.
219 See Puckett, supra note 111.
220
Ibid.; LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 95 (mentioning how the scrap industry even requested
the OECD to delete scrap "products" from the green waste list); Allen, supra note 17, at 175-176 and n.
125.
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inclusion in the amber or red lists" or respectively "red list", "or
b.) prevents the recovery of the waste in an environmentally sound manner". 22 '
The Council of the EU amended art. 16(1) of the Regulation to provide for a total
prohibition of exports of hazardous waste destined for recycling or recovery operations
to non-OECD members. 222 Yet, the potential loophole caused by 'sham' recycling
remains,223 because the notification procedure for 'green waste' still does not require a
signature from the importing country and allows the shipment of wastes for recovery to
countries that are Parties to the Basel Convention and to which the OECD Decision
applies as well.
224
It is important to remember that the EC-Treaty does not contain any definition of
"waste", neither of "goods". 225 Because one cannot distill a clear definition of "waste"
from the existing primary or secondary legislation, 226 the interpretation by the ECJ is the
221 98/368/EU: Commission Decision of 18 May 1998 adapting, pursuant to Article 42(3), Annexes II and
III to Council Regulation (EEL) No. 259/93 on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste
Within, Into and Out of the European Community. O.J. No. L 165, 10 June, 1998, at 0020-0029. Also at:
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/eu/lif/dat/en_398D0368.html>.
222 Council Regulation (EU) No. 120/97 of 20 Jan. 1997 amending Regulation (EU) No. 259/93 on the
Supervision and Control of Shipments of Wastes Within, Into and Out of the EU
,
O.J. No. L.022, 24
Jan., 1997, p.0014-0015; Also available via: <http://europa.en.int/eur-lex/eu/lif/dat/en_397R0120.html>.
223 Skroback, supra note 160, at 109; Allen, supra note 17, at 179 ( refers to some Greenpeace documents
reporting that in the period 1987-1995, 96 attempts by 95 firms to export 34 million metric tons of
hazardous wastes, from Western Europe to Russia, were discovered under the disguise of a "recycling
plan").
224
Allen, supra note 17, at 176.
225 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 87.
226
Id., at 87-90 (for a thorough review: Regulation 259/93 art. 2a) refers to the definition in art. la) of
Directive 75/442 (the 'Framework Directive' at O.J. L 194, July 25 1975, at 47) as amended by Directive
91/156 (O.J. L 78), that "waste shall mean any substance or object in the categories set out in Annex I
which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard". Pursuant to art. la) of Directive 75/442 the
Commission drew up a list, commonly referred to as the "European Waste Catalog", which contains a
codified enumeration of wastes, subject to periodical reviews; but especially drafted to serve as a reference
for the Community program on waste statistics to be prepared in accordance with the Council resolution of
7 May, 1990 on Waste Policy adopted in accordance with Directive 91/689 -replacing Directive 78/3 19- on
toxic and dangerous waste, at O.J. L 84 March 31, 1978,43. But, the three lists of the Regulation do not
correspond to the above mentioned lists in this footnote, thereby creating a source of confusion !).
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main guideline" 7 It is settled case law228 that waste may be considered as a good,
irrespective of the intention of the owner, the positive or negative value which it has and
whether or not it is recyclable 229
2. types of waste shipments
The Regulation classifies the types of waste shipments into five categories:
a.) between Member States;230
b.) within Member States; 231
c.) exports to non-member countries; 232
d.) imports into the Community from non-member countries; 233
e.) transit of waste from outside and through the Community for disposal or recovery
outside the Community. 234
Common to all types of waste shipments is the comprehensive prior
authorization and notification scheme which rests on the notified (and requires the
227
Id., at 90.
*• See: "Zanetti cases", C-206 and C-207/88-(1990) ECR 1-1461; the "Belgian Waste case", supra note
213; joined cases C-304/94 EURO Tombesi,C-3 30/94 Roberto Satella, C-342/94 Giovanni Muzi and
others, C-224/95 Anselmo Savini, decided on June 25, 1997, not yet reported but covered in: Sara Poli,
Case Notes, 7 R.E.C.I.E.L. 8, 1998.
229 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 160, 90-95 (extensive assessment).
230 The Regulation, supra note 210, Title II, chapter A: waste for disposal: art. 3-5; chapter B: waste for
recovery: art.6-1 1; chapter C: waste for disposal and recovery with transit via third states : art. 12.
231
Id., Title III, art. 13.
232
Id., Title IV, chapter A: waste for disposal: art. 14-15; chapter B: waste for recovery: art. 16-18.
233
Id., Title V, chapter A: waste for disposal: art. 19-20; chapter B: waste for recovery: art. 21-22.
234
Id., Title VI, chapter A: wastes for disposal and recovery: art. 23; chapter B: waste for recovery: art. 24.
235
Id., art. 2g): "notifier means any natural person or corporate body to whom or to which the duty to
notify is assigned, that is to say the person referred to hereinafter who proposes to ship waste or have waste
shipped". An interesting test is to determine if a waste broker would fall under those terms...
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consent of the competent authorities236 designated by the Member States) 21 and the main
subdivisions between wastes intended for disposal and those meant for recovery.m
a.) Shipments of waste between Member States
i) The general right to ban wastes for disposal
l.YThe principle: art. 4-3 (a) i
Though both shipments of waste destined for disposal and recovery are subjected
to an analogous procedure, greaterpowers are granted to the Member States to prohibit
the import of waste to be disposed of. Thus, in accordance with the principle of
proximity and self-sufficiency at Community and national levels, Member States may
take measures in accordance with the Treaty,"9 to prohibit generally or partially, or even
to object systematically to shipments of waste destined for disposal. 240 The Regulation
does not contain a similar provision for recovery operations. 241
At the demand of Luxembourg242 a "small country exception" to the right to ban
was inserted, for the situations where the hazardous waste is produced in such small
234
Id., see art. 2, par. b)-e) for definition.
237 Ansbro, supra note 14, at 420.
238
Allen, supra note 17, at 171-172.
239 Skroback, supra note 2 1 1, at 107 (informs us that the words "in accordance with the Treaty" were
inserted as a compromise, "which allowed the more hesitant Member States to sign the Regulation. The
true dimension of this balancing sentence will have to be clarified by the jurisprudence of the ECJ).
240 The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 4, par. 3a).
241 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211, at 68.
242 Skroback, supra note 21 1, at 107; LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1 (to a certain extent Portugal,
Ireland and Greece will benefit from this provision too).
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quantities that the provision of new specialized disposal installations within that State
would be uneconomic. 243
2.^Reasonable objections: art.4-3fb)
Furthermore, the competent authorities of dispatch and destination may raise
reasoned objections to an import:
- based on the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity;
- in order to ensure that the shipments are in accordance with waste management plans;
- to comply with national laws and regulations relating to environmental protection,
public order, public safety or health protection.
244
Thefundamental impact of these provisions is overwhelming if we follow the line
of reasoning of the authors London and Llamas: "(...) the Regulation has become a lex
specialis for the application of the principle of the free movement of goods to waste, to
the detriment of the application of articles 30-36 EU Treaty; (...)the list of conditions and
objections contained in article 4(3) take the place of the list of permitted obstacles to the
free movement of goods contained in article 36 EU Treaty and the mandatory require-
ments".
245
241 The Regulation, supra note 210, see art. 4) 3.a.ii).
244
Id., see art. 4, par. 3 b)-c) (more situations enumerated). LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note, 160, at 67
( the authors have pointed out the futility and the danger for potential conflicts, between the general 'right
to ban' provision and the latter, milder version of it. For why should a Member State which has the right
to "object systematically to shipments of waste" bother to justify a prohibition on the basis of "reasoned
objections" ?).
245 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211, at 140 (emphasis added). The full impact will be clarified
below at pages 49-51.
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//. ) Wastes for recovery - a different treatment
Significantly, the bases of the objections by Member States are considerably
narrower in the case of waste shipments aimed for recovery than for disposal. 246 Another
difference arises in the context of the assessment by the competent authorities of the
notification, is that the control procedure for recovery operations is characterized by a
system of tacit approval, nonexistent in the case of disposal operations.
247
b.) Shipments of waste within a Member State
The Regulation leaves it up to the Member States to establish an appropriate
system for the supervision and control of shipments of waste within their jurisdiction.
This system should take into account the need for coherence with the Community system
established by this Regulation. 248 The authors London and Llamas, once more pertinently
question the possible tension that might rise with the principle of subsidiarity, 249 which
has become quintessential to Community environmental policy since the adoption of the
Single European Act in 1987. 250
246 The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 7 par. 4 only mentions the bases provided in art. 3 pare), not
those in art. 3, par. b)-c); See at large: LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 143.
247 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211, at 143.
24
* The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 13, par.2.
249 See art 3 b) EC-Treaty: "The Community shall act within limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or the effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty". See for further information Revue des Affaires Europeenes-Law and European
Affairs, (1998) 1&2, Mys & Breesch (covering various facets of the growing subsidiarity principle).
250 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211, at 147.
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Since the Regulation was based on art. 130S of the EC-Treaty, the Member States
can "introduce stricter measures generally, and in particular with respect to purely
national movements" than those contained in the Regulation ."'
c.) Exports of waste from the EC to third countries
Under the Regulation, all exports of waste for disposal from an EU member to a
third country are prohibited, except to the countries of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). 252 The practical effect of this provision is limited, now that the
EFTA only encompasses four countries, of which Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are
parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). By virtue of the EEA
the three countries will be considered as "Member States" for the application of the
Regulation. 253 Consequently, the complex control procedure contained in art. 15, for the
export of waste for disposal, only applies to one country: Switzerland. 254
The ban with respect to the export of waste for recovery is less restrictive. The
most important exceptions to the export ban are those to OECD members, parties to the
Basel Convention and those countries with which the EU, or the EU and its Member
States acting jointly, have concluded bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements or
arrangements in accordance with the Basel Convention. 255
According to the Lome-IV Convention, 256 all exports of wastes to the African,
Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries are banned, except where an ACP country has
251
Ibid.
": The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 14 (1). The current members of the EFTA are Iceland, Norway,
Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.
233 LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 211.
w
Id., at 148.
"' The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 16, par. a)-b).
156 Fourth convention of Lome, see supra note 96.
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exported waste for processing to a Member State, in which case the processed waste can
then be returned to the ACP country of origin. 257
d) imports of waste into the EU
All imports into the Community of waste for disposal shall be prohibited, except
those from EFTA countries, parties to the Basel Convention, or countries with which the
Community, or the Community and its Member States, have concluded bilateral,
multilateral agreements or arrangement , compatible with Community legislation and in
accordance with the Basel Convention. 258
e.) the transit of waste from outside and through the for disposal or recovery outside the
EH
Here too, a detailed control system of prior authorization of the authorities
through which the waste will pass is set up. 259 The most flexible provisions are provided
for waste shipments for recovery passing through countries to which the OECD Decision
applies.
260
f. ) provision common to all movements
All shipments of waste not in accordance with the system provided for in the
Regulation, shall be deemed illegal. 261 The illegal "shipper" or the competent authority if
137 The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 18.
*" Id., art. 19; for further comment see LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 2 1 1. at 154-155.
"' The Regulation, supra note 210, art. 23.
260
Id., art. 24; Allen, supra note 17, at 173; LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 155-157.
261 The Regulation, supra note 210, ait. 26, par. la)-f)
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necessary shall be responsible for re-importing the waste to the State of dispatch or, if
this is impractical, they will have to ensure that it is disposed of or recovered in an
environmentally sound manner. 2"
C. How the Right to Ban in the Regulation came to be
The right to ban by Member States, prima facie, in tension with the free
movement of goods,263 was not accepted overnight, but rather a result of different factors
meeting at the same moment.
1 . the French veto
A Franco-German waste crisis arose in August 1992, when custom officials
discovered hazardous hospital waste amidst German domestic waste being imported in
France.
264
France, the largest importer ofEU waste,265 reacted by promulgating a unilateral
ban266 against the import of waste intended for final disposal in its borders. 267 German
business, which was focused on cheaper disposals in France, and Luxembourg which as a
small country was reaching the limit of its disposal capacity, especially felt the
ramifications of France's "retaliatory" ban. 268
262
Id., art. 26, par. 2a)-b).
20 EU Treaty, Part HI, Title I, art. 9-37.
164 Skroback, supra note 21 1, at 96; LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 67
2W Skroback, supra note 211, at 96.
266 Decree 92-798 of 18 August 1992.
247 Skroback, supra note 21 1, at 96; LONDON & LLAMAS , supra note 21 1, 67.
ia Ansbro, supra note 14, at 424-425.
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The importance of this 'waste crisis' arises from the fact that the draft version of
the Regulation did not contain the right to ban as set out in art. 4(3)(a)i It was the French
Environment Minister whom vetoed 269 the adoption of the proposed Regulation , unless
art. 4(3)(a)i, as it stands under its current form was accepted.
270
2. the Belgian Waste case
a/) a genera l introduction
A brief comment on the ECJs previous jurisdiction related to the 'free movement
of goods' in general and its relationship to the 'environment' in specific is needed in order
to understand why the Belgian waste case271 was at the same time welcomed in the
environmentally concerned camp and considered as controversial by those whom could
not reconcile it with the previous case law of the ECJ.
In the absence ofCommunity legislation it will be the role of the ECJ to limit the
freedom ofMember States to enact environmental legislation, which might hamper the
169 At the time art. 130S, being the legal basis of the Regulation, required an unanimous vote from all the
Member States. See Banny Poostchi, Note, 7 R.E.C.I.E.L. 1, (1998) (Only after the Treaty of Maastricht
of 1992 became effective, was a qualified majority in the Council of the EC sufficient. See also New
Treaty to Boost EU Environmental Policies (Apr. 12, 1999) <http://www.ends.co.uk/envdaily>. The
Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 and which entered into force May 1, 1999, has upgraded' the
decision making process under art. 130S from a co-operation procedure with Parliament (art. 189C) to a so-
called co-decision procedure (art. 189B) giving Parliament a right to veto but not to initiate legislation
yet).
270 See LONDON & LLAMAS, supra note 21 1, at 67.
271 Supra note 213.
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free movement of goods, i.e. limitation through negative harmonization through the
application of articles 30-36. 272
i.) the principle : art. 30 EC-Treatv
Art. 30 of the EC-Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect. Yet, as Weatherill and Beaumont remind us, the ECJ
has in practice rarely dealt with quantitative restrictions as such, since quotas on trade
between Member States were mainly abolished under the auspices of the GATT. 273 In its
leading judgment Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 11A the ECJ interpreted measures having
equivalent effect as "all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of
hindering, directly or indirectly, actively or potentially, intra-Community trade ". This
broad definition encompasses both discriminatory measures against foreign producers as
neutral measures that in effect erect barriers to interstate trade.
275
272 WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 524. The implication for the Member States
when the Community legislator has acted, i.e. through positive harmonization, regarding maintaining or
introducing more stringent national environmental legislation varies depending on which legal ground the
legislation was based - art 100a(4) free market oriented which allows less 'opting out' than art 130(t)
related to the environment. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 significantly amended/inserted articles
100a(3)-100a(8), clarifying some previous contentions surrounding art. 100a(4), but introducing many
other interpretative problems, raising many doubts regarding its real practicality for those Member States
which desire to insert higher environmental standards. See especially Poostchi, supra note 233 (the author
gives a concise and clear analysis of the articles in a post-Amsterdam era); See for a general background
e.g. Geradin, supra note 208, at 162-177; WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 483-485
273 WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 429.
274 C-8/74 (1974) ECR 837, par. 5 (italics added).
275
T. Sexton, Enacting National Environmental Laws More Stringent Than Other States ' Laws in the
European Community, 24 C.I.L. 575 (1991).
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//. ) the exceptions
*) the legal exception : art. 36 EC-Treatv
Art. 36 enumerates an exhaustive list of derogations from art 30 for non-economic
values,
276
such as public morality, public policy or public security, the protection of
human health, animals or plants. Ludwig Kramer277 enlightens that according to the case
law of the ECJ the majority of environmental measures will not be able to be subsumed
under art. 36. The Court scrutinizes if the measure has a direct effect on the protection of
humans or flaura/fauna that can be supported by scientific evidence or a genuine scientific
doubt; if the measure does not pass the threshold it is an environmental measure. 278 For
instance, the restriction on the use of CFC's in products aims at the protection of the
ozone layer which may increase diseases of humans, such as skin cancer, will be
considered an environmental measure since the health risk of humans is an indirect one. 279
The second sentence of art. 36 contains a built-in restriction, since the permitted
exceptions may not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States". Or, as Sexton puts it, " a national measure
that genuinely aims to achieve an art. 36 objective may discriminate against imports, but
only if it does not do so arbitrarily". 290
276 LUDWIG KRAMER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASEBOOK 95, n. 5 (Ed. Sweet &
Maxwell, 1993).
277 Ludwig Kramer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 C.M.L.R. 111,1 17-118
(1993).
271 WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 465-466.
279 Kramer, supra note 277, at 117-1 18 (e.g. environmental taxes, environmental labeling, waste prevention
measures, measures to assess the envirQnmental impact and measures on environmental liability will all be
considered as environmental measures)!
2,0 Sexton, supra note 275, at 576 (emphasis added).
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Not only has the ECJ always insisted on the strict interpretation of art 36, 28 ' but above
all it decided that the onus of compliance rests on the Member States. 282
**) the jurisdictional exception - mandatory requirements
The famous Cassis de Dijon283 judgment expounded the exceptions from art. 30,
by announcing that "obstacles to movement in the Community resulting from disparities
between the laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in
sofar as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements (...)."
A fundamental difference between a "mandatory requirement" and an art. 36 exception
lays in the applicability of the former to non-discriminatory measures™
Nevertheless the two distinct concepts also share an important similarity, namely
its subjection to the "proportionality test'. A measure will in general be regarded as being
proportional by the ECJ if it aims to pursue a legitimate political objective; if it is
appropriate to achieve this objective; if it is necessary to reach the objective and if there is
no measure which is less restrictive for the free movement of goods. 285
J
" See C-7161 Commission v. Italy (1961) ECR 317, C-72/83, Campus Oil v. Ministryfor Industry and
Energy (1984) ECR 1299, C-16/83 Karl Prantl (1984) ECR 2727.
282
C-227/82, Leendert v. Bennekom (1983) ECR 3883 and WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note
209, at 455.
285 C-120/78 Rewe Zentrale v. Bundesmonopol - Verwaltungfur Branntwein (1979) ECR 649, (1979) 3
CMLR 494, at par. 8 (emphasis added).
284 See C-227/82 Van Bennekom, (1983) ECR 3883; B. Jadot, Mesures Nationales de Police de
I 'Environnement, Libre Circulation des Marchandises et Proportionaiite, 26 Cahiers de Droit Europeen
408 (1990); Erin A. Walter, The Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Callfor Desperate
Measures: Looking to the European Union for a Lesson in Environmental Protection, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1 161, 1 184 (1996) (the author refines the distinction even further - albeit without any reference - by
writing that the ECJ "has not distinguished between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory measures in
article 36 cases").
245 Sexton, supra note 275, at 576; WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 455.
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//'/. ) the Danish Bottles Case
*) before thejudgment
In the Waste Oil Case,286 rendered in the early 1980s, the ECJ acknowledged for
the first time2 "7 the protection of the environment as one of the Community's essential
objectives. As such, it could justify certain limitations on the principle of freedom of
trade. By doing so, the ECJ opened the door for further reaching decisions as in the
Danish Bottles Case. 288
**)the judgment
The quintessence of the Danish Bottles Case is the ECJs recognition of the
protection ofthe environment as a mandatory requirement™ The ECJ had to assess
existing Danish legislation,290 which installed a system where manufacturers had to market
beer and soft drinks only in reusable containers which could be integrated in a deposit and
return system.
291 The Danish legislation further required that the containers at stake
should be approved of by the National Agency for the Protection of the Environment.
Manufacturers could be exempted from the approval when they did not exceed a certain
186 C-240/83 Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs d'Huiles Usagees
(ABDHU) (1985) ECR 531.
2,7 In case 172/82, Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Huiles de Graissage and Others v.
Groupement d'lnteret Economique, (1983) ECR 555, the ECJ already touched upon the balance between
environmental protection and free movement of goods, but avoided examining it. See further, David. A.
Demiray, The Movement ofGoods in a Green Market, 1 L.I. E.I. 82, (1994).
in C-302/86 Commission v. Denmark (1988) ECR 4607 (1989); CMLR 619.
2W
Ibid., at par. 9.
190 See Danish Law nr. 297 (June 8, 1978) and Danish Order nr. 397 and nr. 95 (March 16, 1984).
291
C-302/86, supra note 288, par. 2-3. It is noteworthy that the ECJ had already clarified that national
measures as to the type ofpackaging of goods, were capable of affecting trade between Member States, in
Case 261/81 Walter Rau v. de Smedt (1982) ECR 3961, par. 12.
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yearly quantity or if importers test the market, and if a deposit and return system was
established.
292
First, the ECJ replied that the establishment of a deposit-and-return system must
be considered as an indispensable element of a system intended to ensure the reuse of
containers and regarded it as necessary to achieve the pursued aims and thus
proportionate™ Secondly, the ECJ deemed the approval system as unnecessary if the
manufacturers established a deposit-and-return system. Even though the ECJ admitted
that approved standardized packages might maximize the protection of the environment,
it conceded that non-approved containers could protect the environment too. 294
b.) the Belgian waste case in the era before the Regulation: more confusion or a
solution ?
Wallonia, the Southern Region of Belgium, had become a destination for "waste
tourism" due to its lax approach towards environmental regulations. 295 The effect of this
"laissez faire" approach was that about three to four hundred old sand quarries were
purchased by entrepreneurs in order to fill them with waste. 296 Medical diagnoses of the
people of the concerned villages found a considerable amount of exposure to toxins. 297
292
C-302/86, supra note 288, paras. 2-3. The Danish legislation also flatly bans the import of metal
containers, but it was an issue not dealt with by the ECJ in its 'Danish Bottles' decision. The
Commission filed a case against Denmark on April 21, 1999, for this part of the unaltered legislation, as
being contrary to the Packaging Directive 94/62. See more extensively <http://www.ends.co.uk/envdaily>
(Apr. 21, 1999).
293
Ibid., at par. 13.
294
Ibid., paras. 19-21.
295 WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT, supra note 209, at 516.
296
Daniel W. Simcox, The Future ofEurope Lies in Waste: The Importance ofthe Proposed Directive on
Civil Liabilityfor Damage Caused by Waste to the European Community and its Environmental Policy,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 543, 547 (1995).
297
Id., at 547-548.
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The Wallonian Regional Government reacted by promulgating a Decree which banned the
import of all waste products. 298
The Commission qualified this Decree as contrary to art. 30, the Waste Directive
of 1984299 and the 'Framework' Directive 75/442 on Waste. 300 The Advocate-General first
claimed the infringement of Directive 84/63 1, which established a detailed system for the
control of transfontier shipment of dangerous waste. The reliance on art. 36 could,
according to A.-G. Jacobs, only be accepted with regard to the categories of dangerous
waste excluded from the scope of Directive 84/63 1 301 The ECJ judged that in a situation
of complete harmonization, the Member States could not rely on art. 36. i02 The second
Directive 75/442 only contained a.framework for the supervision of non-dangerous
waste. Here, the Advocate-General pleaded the rejection of the reliance on a "mandatory
requirement" exception when dealing with a discriminatory regional law
,
303
The ECJ, by contrast, controversially concluded that the Decree did not
discriminate. The Court's rationale was based on the distinctions between wastefrom
different regions and art J30R (2)following which environmental damages must be
rectified at the source.*
04 The unique legal reasoning leaves many scholars305 with only one
298 Damien Geradin, The Belgian Waste Case, 19 E.L.R. 145, 146 (1993) (citing: "Art. 1 par. 1, as
amended by art. 130 of a Decree of July 23, 1987, prohibits the storage, tipping or dumping of waste from
a foreign country in authorized depots, stores and tips in Wallonia, except in depots annexed to an
installation for the destruction, neutralization and disposal of toxic waste (...) Under art. 3, the storage,
tipping or dumping of waste from other Belgian regions, namely Flanders and Brussels, is also prohibited,
but exceptions may be made in accordance with agreements to be made with other regions"); See also L.
Hancher and H. Sevenster, Case Law, 30 C.M.L.R. 351 (1991).
299 See supra note 208.
300 See supra note 226.
101 Commission v. Belgium, supra note 213, at 21.
102
Id., at 11-14 and 20.
303
Id., par. 20.
504
Id., par. 34 and 36.
309 Geradin, supra note 298, at 160; Demiray, supra note 287, at 95; WEATHERILL and BEAUMONT,
supra note 209, at 517-518.
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possible interpretation, namely that the ECJ upheld Cassis de Dijon exceptions in a
facially discriminatory situation. Probably the Court did not intend to expand its
longstanding Cassis de Dijon reasoning, since it did not reappraise this rationale in other
cases so far. The Court indeed tried to stress that it was the particular facts and issues
involved that supported its reasoning: "So far as the environment is concerned, it should
be observed that waste has a special characteristic. The accumulation of waste, even
before it becomes a health hazard, constitutes a threat to the environment because of the
limited capacity of each region or locality for receiving it". 306 The Court also referred to
the Basel Convention, "to which the Community is a party" to strengthen its argument in
favor of the principle that environmental damage should be rectified at the source. 307
"However, in order to determine whether the obstacle in question is discriminatory, the
particular type ofwaste must be taken into account".
30%
"It follows that, having regard to
the differences between waste produced in one place and that in another and its connection
with the place where it is produced, the contested measures cannot be considered to be
discriminatory ". 309
Not surprisingly, and in despite of the later adopted Regulation 259/93 which
confirmed the Court's goal, this legal construction invited much criticism.
Damien Geradin questioned the deduction based on the particular nature of waste and
found it "a rather weak justification" that does not ensure legal certainty and "opens the
door to potential abuse". 310 Hancher and Sevenster even went as far as writing that the
reference to the Basel Convention was "irrelevant", since it covered hazardous wastes and
306 Commission v. Belgium, supra note 213, at par. 30.
107
Id., paras. 34-35.
308
Id., par. 34.
309
Id., par. 36.
310 Geradin, supra note 298, at 190.
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the remaining issue involved non-hazardous wastes
J
" But most profoundly, it is
questionable if the ECJ respected its proportionality-test by not taking into consideration
less restrictive options for the Wallonian Government. 312
3.) summation
Thus, the imminent ratification of the Basel Convention, the ECJs landmark decision in
the Belgian Waste Case and a significant French veto, accumulated in the acceptance of a
'right to ban by Member States' under the Regulation 259/93.
J
" Hancher and Sevenster, supra note 298, at 363.
112 Geradin, supra note 298, at 190.
Chapter IV.
The internal approach bv the United States:
A A basic undertone
Of the more than fifteen million tons of garbage that cross state lines of the U.S.,
approximately 2.2 million tons of hazardous waste cross international borders every year,
and 375,000 tons of hazardous waste move in interstate commerce each year. 313 On how
the United States deals with the interstate and intrastate movement of waste will be dealt
with in this chapter. 3"1 A certain background on federalism in the United States needs to
be depicted first.
Since the U.S. Constitution does not delegate powers regarding the protection of
the environment to the United States, the states are entitled to take measures in this
field.
3 ' 5 Of importance for the aspect of the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes is the constitutional provision that reads: "The Congress shall have Power ...To
regulate Commerce...among the several States". 316 The Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted this Commerce Clause to give the Congress power to restrict or
advance free trade among the states, to the detriment of the powers of the states in this
111 Walter, supra note 284, at 1 162 (quoting visually that the United States generates enough garbage in
one year "to fill a convoy of gaibage trucks stretching eight times around the globe").
314 The approach by the U.S. towards extra-territorial movements of hazardous wastes is briefly covered at
pages 28-33.
315 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
316
U.S. Const, art. I, s. 8, cl. 3.
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broad field. 317 Mr. Geradin mentions that it is "generally admitted that physical
transportation of pollution across states amounts to interstate commerce" 3I8 Thus, in
1976 Congress decided to use its Commerce Clause powers and enacted RCRA, 319 which
established preventive craddle-to-grave measures such as the identification and listing of
hazardous wastes, a tracking system of those listed hazardous wastes, the standardization
of requirements for generators and transporters of hazardous wastes and for operators of
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
,
a permit system to guarantee the
aforementioned requirements, etc... 320 Even though RCRA is a federal legislative product,
it delegates an important part of its implementation primarily to the states, via the
administration of permits. 321 Importantly, RCRA deliberately left the management of
'solid waste' (hazardous and non-hazardous wastes) to the states. 322
Respecting the scope of this thesis, no further analysis will be given of the RCRA
requirements, but rather an analysis of the tensions that exist between states over whose
waste can be disposed of where, will be rendered. In the absence of federal regulation
regarding the implications of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, states
have tried to protect their environment from the consequences posed by the accumulation
of waste, caused by the flourishing business in the management and disposal of hazardous
1,7 The OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 167 (Kermit L. Hall, Oxford University
Press, 1992) (this phrase "generated more litigation between 1789 and 1950 than any other clause in the
Constitution and eventually became the single most important source of national power"); Lisa
Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 217, 218 ("...the Commerce Clause is
perhaps most famous for what it does not say. ..As a result it took the Court itself some time to sort out
what the grant of power to Congress meant for the power of the States"); See extensively DONALD E.
LIVELY, PHOEBE A. HADDON, DOROTHY E. ROBERTS and RUSSELL L. WEAVER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES 305-409 (Anderson Publishing
Company 1996).
3
" Geradin, supra note 208, at 144-145.
119 See supra note 154.
120 PERCIVAL. MILLER, SCHROEDER, LEAPE, supra note 179, at 209, see also at 208-279 (extremely
enriching and thorough analysis).
321
Id., at 209 and 212.
122 42 U.S.C. s. 6901(a)(4) (1994) ("the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be
primarily the function of the State, regional, and local agencies").
58
and non-hazardous wastes,"3 through devices to limit or prohibit the import of out of
state waste.
B. The judicial limits related to the interstate and intrastate movement of waste
1. the Supreme Court guards over the Dormant Commerce Clause..
In the absence of federal legislation324 to regulate the state's right to ban the
import of waste, the so-called dormant, silent, or negative portion of the Commerce
Clause325 as interpreted by the Supreme Court places a limitation on the states' power to
regulate interstate commerce.
326 The Supreme Court guards the impact of the Commerce
Clause as a "final arbiter" of the competing demands of an integrated trade market and the
protection of the environment by each state in the United States. 327
The United States Supreme Court uses three different tests when determining the
constitutional limits on state restrictions of free trade: 328 a.) the Pike balancing test for
non-discriminatory measures; b.) the Dean Milk 'no adequate alternatives' test for
discriminatory measures; c.) the Philadelphia 'virtually per se invalidity' rule for
arbitrarily discriminatory measures.
323 Walter, supra note 284, at 1162-1163.
324 The doctrine of preemption, i.e. the overriding effect that federal legislation has over state legislation in
a situation of substantive conflict between both legislations, or if state statutes are contrary to the
Congressional intention to preempt, will not be dealt with. See for clarifying insight: LIVELY,
HADDON, ROBERTS and WEAVER, supra note 317, at 389-395; PERCIVAL, MILLER,
SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 115-118, 121-123; Geradin, supra note 208, at 146-151.
323
Walter, supra note 284, at 1 164 and n. 22.
316 PERCIVAL, MILLER, SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 402.
327
Ibid.; note similar wordings in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) ("...where Congress
has not acted, this Court, and and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of
the competing demands of state and national interests").
3a See for an excellent synthesis Walter, supra note 284, at 1 188-1200; Geradin, supra note 208, at 151-
162.
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a the Pike balancing test for non-discriminators measures
Before the Court will even apply the balancing test as set forth in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. 329 it must find that the state statute regulates evenhandedly, for the Court has
always consistently made a distinction between "outright protectionism and more indirect
burdens on the flow of trade". 330 Once the Court has found the state statute to be non-
discriminatory the Pike balancing test strictu sensu will be applied and the statute upheld
if: 1.) the statute serves a legitimate localpublic interest, 2.) its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, 3.) unless the burden imposed on such a commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
331
If a legitimate local interest is found, the question becomes one of degree. The extent of
the burden that will be tolerated will depend on "the nature ofthe local interests involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with lesser impact on interstate activities" m
In general a state measure which is not discriminatory and whose primary objective is to
protect the environment will be considered as pursuing a legitimate, and even compelling,
state interest.
333 At times it even seems that lower courts do not apply any balancing test
once they found the statute to be evenhanded and to serve a legitimate state interest. 334
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Geradin, supra note 208, at 152.
331 See supra note 328, at 142 (emphasis added) (referring to Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (I960)); compare with the ECJ balancing test, supra at page 51.
332
Ibid, (emphasis added).
333
Geradin, supra note 208, at 153 ; Walter, supra note 284, at 1191; LIVELY, HADDON, ROBERTS
and WEAVER, supra note 317, at 368.
334
Walter, supra note 284, at 1192; Geradin supra note 208, at 158-159 (the author even detects a new and
more lenient "rational relation test" for nondiscriminatory measures where no balancing test at all has been
applied after the respective courts found the measures to be evenhanded and legitimate , e.g. in Procter and
Gamble v. the City ofChicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), and American
Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm 'n, 517 P.2d 691 (1972). Yet other courts have explicitly
declined to follow those decisions and applied the Pike balancing test, e.g. Virgin Islands Port Authority v.
Virgin Islands Taxi Ass'n, 979 F. Supp. 344 (1997) and Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberley, 822 F. 2d
388 (1987) (3rd Cir.)).
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A good illustration of the application of the Pike balancing test can be found in the
Minnesota v. Clover LeafCreamery Co."s case, where milk sellers challenged the
constitutionality of a Minnesota statute banning retail sale of milk in plastic
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers, such as paper board milk cartons. 336
The Court found that the statute did not effect "simple protectionism" and that it was a
non-discriminatory regulation since it prohibited all milk retailers from selling their
products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers, without regard to whether the milk,
the containers or the sellers are from outside the state 331 It further analyzed that the
burden imposed on interstate commerce was "relatively minor", now that milk products
still move freely across the Minnesota border and since most dairies package their
products in more than one type of containers. 338 The Court reasoned that there was no
reason to suspect that "the gainers will be Minnesota firms, or the losers out-of-state
firms".
339 Even though the Court acknowledged that some (albeit exaggerated) arguments
could be made to prove that the out-of-state industries might be burdened relatively more,
it could never be found "clearly excessive in the light of the substantial state interest in
promoting conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing solid waste
disposal problems". 340 In other words, the Court will accept environmental regulations
that may discourage out-of-state business, but that do not necessarily give local
enterprises an unfair advantage over out-of-state competition. 341 Moreover, the Court
133 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
336
Id., at 449.
337
Id, at 471-472.
"' Id., at 472.
339
Id., at 473.
340
Ibid.
341 LIVELY, HADDON, ROBERTS and WEAVER, supra note 317, at 368.
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added that there was no approach with a lesser impact on interstate activities, since
banning all nonreturnables would be more burdensome on interstate commerce or
providing incentives to recycle would be less effective. 342
Interestingly enough, a rather clear parallelism can be found between the Clover
Leaf Creamery case rendered by the U. S. Supreme Court and the Danish Bottles case
held by the ECJ, not only in the facts but also in the reasoning of both courts. 341
b.) the Dean Milk 'no adequate alternatives' test for discriminatory measures
The Supreme Court treats discriminatory state statutes with more suspicion than
evenhanded measures, and it applies differing tests depending on whether they are
arbitrarily discriminatory or not. 344 In both cases discriminatory measures are conceived
by the Court as presumptively invalid. 345
The test used for discriminatory measures was developed in Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison™6 In Dean Milk the Court struck down an ordinance of Madison, Wisconsin,
which made it unlawful to sell milk as pasteurized unless it had been processed and
bottled at an approved pasteurization plant within a radius of 5 miles from the city. 347
Even though the statute might have seemed facially neutral since it applied to all milk to
be sold in Madison, 348 the Court found that the ordinance plainly discriminatory against
interstate commerce in its practical effect since it excluded the distribution of milk
MI
Ibid.
MJ See supra at pages 52-53.
3*4
Walter, supra note 284, at 1 188.
145 LIVELY, HADDON, ROBERTS and WEAVER, supra note 3 17, at 368.
146 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
M7
Id., at 349 (emphasis added).
"* Geradin, supra note 208, at 155.
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produced and pasteurized in a plant outside the radius of 5 miles from the city.349 The
Court added that the ordinance simply erected an economic barrier to protect a major local
industry against competition from without the State 35° Furthermore it held that "even in
the exercise of the unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people"
such a discriminatory legislation cannot be enacted if reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives are available to conserve legitimate local interests.
351 The Court even
explicitly referred to the possibility for the city of Madison to rely on its own officials
for inspection of distant milk sources, for which it could charge the actual and reasonable
cost from producers and processors. 352
The Dean Milk test implies that a facially neutral statute but which has a discriminatory
impact can be upheld only if: 1.) the statute furthers a legitimate local interest and 2.) in
the absence of reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. 353
Again, this line of reasoning corresponds with the Danish Bottles case where the
ECJ struck down the part of the Danish legislation that installed an approval system by
the Danish National Agency for the Protection of the Environment. 354
349 Supra note 346, at 354 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig. Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935): "The importer
...may keep his milk or drink it, but sell it he may not").
350
Ibid.
151
Ibid.
351
Id., at 354.
153
Geradin, supra note 208, at 155 (this approach has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Washington State apple Advertising Comm 'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)).
354 See supra, pages 52-53.
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c) the Philadelphia 'virtually per se invalidity' rule for arbitrarily discriminatory
measures
For statutes that are facially, unambiguously or arbitrarily discriminatory the
Supreme Court has developed a test with a higher validity threshold.
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey*" the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the
interstate movement of waste. 356 A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of
most solid and liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits
of the state. 357 Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court first had to
assess if waste could be considered as an item of 'commerce' in the meaning of the
Commerce Clause. 358 It differentiated the waste at stake from its old 'quarantine cases', in
which it decided that some objects were not "legitimate subjects of trade and commerce"
such as diseased livestock that required destruction as soon as possible because their very
movement risked contagion. 359 Above all those quarantine laws did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles,
whatever their origin. 360 The Court further spelled out that all objects of interstate trade
merit Commerce Clause protection and that none is excluded by definition at the outset 361
353 437 U.S. 617(1978).
356 Walter, supra note 284, at 1 194; The Supreme Court had already upheld local efforts to manage solid
waste by controlling waste flow in 1905. In California Reduction Co. v, Sanitary Reduction Works, 199
U.S. 306, 325 (1905) (upholding San Francisco ordinance requiring all refuse generated within the city to
be disposed of at specific, private facility) and in Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 333 (1905)
(upholding Detroit ordinance requiring all garbage to be collected and disposed of by a single operator).
337 Supra note 355, at 618.
331
Id., at 621.
339
Id, at 628 and at 622 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888))
(referring to articles "which on account of their existing condition, would bring in and spread disease,
pestilence, and death, such as rags or other substances infected with the germs or yellow fever or or the
virus of small-pox, or cattle or meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise from
their condition and quality, unfit for for human use or consumption")
360
Id, at 628.
361
Id., at 622.
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The result of the Court's reasoning leads to a similar approach as the settled case law
established by the ECJ. 362
The crucial inquiry for the Court was whether it could find the legislation at stake
to be a protectionist measure, or whether it could fairly be viewed as a law directed to
legitimate local concerns, effecting the interstate commerce only incidentally. 363 At the
outset of its analysis the Court reminds us of the principle of economic unity among all
the states in the U.S implies that "one state in its dealings with another may not place
itself in a position of economic isolation". 364 Referring to its previous case law the Court
reiterated that where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, "a
virtuallyper se rule ofinvalidity has been erected".
365
The Court found the legislative purpose of the act, consisting of the protection of the
environment, and the health and safety of the citizens ofNew Jersey from the
accumulation of waste in the overburdened landfills of the state, irrelevant since "the evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends". 360 Especially,
states cannot take discriminatory measures against out-of-state articles unless there is
some reason, apartfrom their origin, to treat them differently. 367 The harms caused by
waste arise after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point, as New Jersey conceded
there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste The Court
concluded: "if one is inherently harmful, so is the other". 368 It made it very clear that
states cannot isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against
162 See supra, at page 40-41.
363 Supra note 357, at 624.
364 Supra note 357, at 623 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, supra note 351, at 527).
365
Id., at 624.
344
Id., at 626.
367
Ibid.
368
Id., at 629.
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the movement of interstate trade. 369 The Supreme Court further advised the New Jersey
legislator to pursue its valid intentions through means which would apply to all waste
flowing into the state's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce might
incidentally be affected.
Here, by contrast the ECJ differed quite strikingly in its approach to very similar
facts in the Belgian Waste case, allowing Wallonia to ban the import of waste from other
European countries and even from the two other regions in Belgium. 370
2. and does not become more lenient
From a practical perspective it should be stressed that the Supreme Court
expressed it had "no opinion" regarding the situation where the states or local
governments act as market participants rather than as regulators. 371 As a result federal and
state courts have held that state, county or municipal landfills may discriminate against or
even prohibit out-of-state waste without violating the dormant commerce clause. 372 Given
that state and local governments own or operate approximately 80 % of the nation's
369
Id., at 628.
370 See supra pages 53-56.
371
Id., at 618, n.6.
372 See for example, Evergreen Waste System v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F.Supp. 127 (Or. 1986),
affd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.1987); County Comm 'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473
A.2d 12 (1984); see Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (The Reeves decision developed a more
permissive view of efforts by states to ensure that state-created resources be reserved for use by their
citizens.
66
landfills, this venue open to states is the most important exception to Philadelphia v
New Jersey, i.e. the so-called market participant exception™
But the remaining situations have given rise to considerable confusion among the
lower courts. 374 Despite Philadelphia v. New Jersey, approximately 25 states have
implemented a variety of environmental policies which effectively restrict the importation
of waste into their states. 3" Considering that states handle the solid waste problem
through mainly incineration, recycling, source reduction and land filling, 376 and that 40% of
all landfills operating in the U.S.may soon be filled to capacity, the reaction by those
various states can be understood. 377 However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed, and even
increased,
378
the basic tenets of Philadelphia v. New Jersey in four other 'waste
decisions'.
379
373 David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: the Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial
'Natural' Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (1989) (the author
urges the states to take this venue and analyzes lower court decisions extensively); PERCIVAL. MILLER,
SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 417-418; Howard G. Hopkirk, The Future ofSolid Waste
Import Bans Under the Dormant Commerce Clause: Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department ofNatural Resources, 4 VTLL. ENVTL. L. J. 395, 407 (1993) (die author mentions
quarantine laws and scarce resources as other exceptions, but for the latter he does not refer to any case law)
(It should be noted on the contrary that in Oregon Waste Syst. v. Dept. ofEnv. Quality, infra note 379, the
Supreme Court explicitly denies the natural resource exception landfill space); Geradin, supra note 208, at
n. 97.
374
Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant Commerce Clause,
50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 157 (1997) (by 1995 the lower courts produced over forty significant decisions
involving waste and commerce; the author enumerates them in n.8).
375 Hopkirk, supra note 373, at 396-397.
376 Jonathan P. Meyers, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of
Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L. J. 567, 570 (1991); See PERCIVAL. MILLER,
SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 265-269 (Art. 1002 (b)(7) ofRCRA describes land
disposal, particularly landfill and surface impoundment, as the least favored method for managing
hazardous wastes. During the amendment of RCRA in 1984, Congress also enacted provisions to prohibit
land disposal gradually. The land disposal ban is basically applicable to untreated hazardous wastes, and
allows EPA to require wastes to be treated by the best demonstrated available technology).
377 David Wartinbee, Swim Resource System, Inc. v. Lycoming County: Our Barriers to Solid Wastes Are
Growing, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 527, 528 (1990).
171 Cox, supra note 374, at 156, 166, 175-188.
379 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill. Inc.
v. Michigan Department ofNatural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Oregon Waste Svstems, Inc. v. Dept
ofEnvtl. Qual. 511 U.S. 93 (1994); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town ofClarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt™ an operator of a commercial hazardous
waste facility challenged the constitutionality of an Alabama statute imposing an
additionalfee on all hazardous waste generated outside the state.
381
In its brief decision
the Court mainly reiterated the principles of Philadelphia v. New Jersey the additional
fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated in states other than
Alabama382 and this in despite of the fact that no State may attempt to isolate itself from a
problem common to several states. 383 Quite confusingly the Court accepted the state's
argument that they should be allowed to prove that the act served legitimate local
purposes and that nondiscriminatory adequate alternatives were unavailable, 384 for it
resembled the Dean Milk balancing test it previously applied to measures discriminatory
in their practical effect.
385 The Court, like in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, found that there
was "absolutely no evidence" that the waste generated outside Alabama was more
dangerous than the waste generated in Alabama. 386 Again, it pointed out to less
discriminatory measures to serve the valid state concerns,
387
such as levying a per-ton
additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama. 388 It further
580 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
3,1
Id., at 337 and at 338-339 (the law imposed: a.) a 'base fee' of $25.60 per ton on all hazardous waste
disposed of in the state, regardless of state of origin; b.) an 'additional fee' of $72.00 per ton on all out-of-
state hazardous waste disposed of in the state and c.) placed a cap on the amount of hazardous waste that
could be disposed of in any Alabama facility during a one-year period).
3W
Id., at 342.
J,J
Id., at 340.
iU
Id., at 342-343.
JC See Geradin, supra note 208, at 161-162.
JM 504 U.S. 334, supra note 379, at 344.
3r
Id., at 343 ( "1.) protection of the health and safety of the citizens of Alabama from toxic substances; 2.)
conservation of the environment and the state's natural resources; 3.) provision for compensatory revenue
for the costs and burdens that out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in
Alabama; 4.) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling on the state's highways, which flow creates a
great risk to the health and safety of the state's citizens").
3M
Id., at 345.
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scope of the discrimination, not the discrimination itself 3W As it had done before, the
court also suggested a nondiscriminatory measure such as limiting the amount of waste
that landfill operators may accept per year in general. 396
Though the decision evokes a standard Philadelphia analysis in its many
references to it, Mr. Cox has interestingly observed that in a subtle way the Court left its
seemingly more lenient balancing test in Chemical Waste Management and has shifted
subtly towards an almost rudimentary test, where no weighing of benefits and burdens on
the interstate commerce is applied, once the measures are found to be discriminatory. 397
The author, supporting Michigan's arguments,398 asserts that there was an opportunity in
Fort Gratiot to apply the Pike test (a statute serving a legitimate local public interest and
its effects on interstate commerce only being incidental) for unlike the "charades of
legitimate local purpose, which the court unmasked as economic protectionism" in cases
like Dean Milk and Philadelphia, Michigan was potentially capable of showing that its
legislation neither displaced neither severely harmed the interstate waste market. 399 Mr.
Hopkirk by contrast doubts a different outcome if the Pike test would have been applied
by the Supreme Court since Michigan still failed to identify any reason apart from origin
why solid waste from outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste
within the county. 400 Basically, Mr. Cox favors a less mechanical approach by the
Supreme Court, which he founds to merely pigeon-hole cases as discriminatory or
595
Id., at 363.
396
Id., at 367.
597 Cox, supra note 374, at 170.
39t 504 U.S. 353, see supra note 379, at 361.
599 Cox, supra note 374, at 171.
400 Hopkirk, supra note 373, at 412-413 and n. 90.
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nondiscriminatory without really assessing if the actual effects of those environmentally
inspired measures actually harm or benefit the out-of-state waste market. 401
Two terms later, in 1994, the Supreme Court revisited the issue at stake in
Chemical Waste Management in its judgment Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department
ofEnvironmental Quality, namely can a state justify a higher fee on waste originating out
of state? 402 In Chemical Waste Management the Court had left open the possibility that
such a differential surcharge might be valid if based on the real costs of disposing of waste
from other states. 403 The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality oversees the
state's regulatory scheme by developing and executing plans for the management,
reduction, and recycling of solid wastes. To fund many of its activities The Department
levies a wide range of fees, amongst which a certain 'surcharge' based on the costs the
state of Oregon or its political subdivisions might encounter of disposing of solid
nonhazardous waste generated out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for. In
conjunction the legislature imposed a fee on the in-state nonhazardous disposal of waste
generated within Oregon, albeit at a much lower cost. 404 The Court was quick in finding
the legislation obviously discriminatory, therefore the virtually per se rule was triggered
and it was up to Oregon to prove that its act advanced a legitimate local purpose that
could not be served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. 405
In this one sentence the Court almost spells out that the two different tests for
discriminatory measures have grown together. It should be mentioned, perhaps as an
answer to Mr. Cox that the Court verbatim refuted to take into consideration the minimal
401 Cox, supra note 374, at 156, 171-173.
402 511 U.S. 93, supra note 379.
403
Id., at 95.
404
Id., at 96 (the in-state fee is capped at $0.85 per ton; the out-of-state fee adds up to $2.25 per ton and
$0.85, the latter with the proviso that if the surcharge survives the judicial challenge, it shall be repealed)
405
Id., at 99.
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impact of the surcharge fee on the interstate commerce, its discriminatory character is the
sole factor taken into consideration.
406
The Court remained very strict in its analysis of valid reasons as to why the out-
of-state waste required to be charged almost three times more. The 'compensatory' tax
doctrine, accepted by the Court to support a discriminatory tax on interstate commerce if
it imposes the rough equivalent of an identifiable and 'substantially similar' tax on
intrastate commerce., was dismissed in this case. Oregon, to no avail, tried to argue that it
searched compensation for the general tax the Oregonians had already paid, and of which a
part was dedicated to waste problems. 407 Since no more precise evidence of the exact
allocation of he general tax revenues was presented, Oregon's act was judged invalid. 408
Currently the last and factually quite different 'waste' decision by the Supreme
Court is C&A Carbone v. Town ofClarkstown.m In this case the Court had to consider
the constitutionality of a so-calledy7ow control ordinance , which required a//410
nonhazardous solid waste (both generated or brought into the town) to be processed at a
designated transfer station before leaving the municipality. 4" The scheme Clarkstown,
New York, developed after it closed down its landfill went as follows. The town wanted
to build a transfer station costing about $1 .4 million and a local private contractor agreed
to construct the facility and operate it for five years, after which the town would buy it
for $1
.
During those five years, the town guaranteed a minimum waste flow of 120,000
tons in a year, for which the contractor could charge the hauler a so-called tipping fee of
$81 per ton. If the station received less than 120,000 tons in a year, the town promised
406
Id., at 100, n. 4.
407
Id., at 103.
401
Id., at 108.
409 511 U.S. 383, see supra note 379.
410 Unlike in Chemical Waste Management and Oregon Waste Systems.
411 511 U.S. 383, supra note 379, at 386.
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to make up the tipping fee deficit. The object of this arrangement was to amortize the
cost of the transfer station: the town would finance its new facility with the income
generated by the tipping fees. A recycling company, C&A Carbone, petitioned the
validity of the flow control ordinance since it obliged the company to bring the non
recyclable residues to the transfer station, thereby not allowing it to ship the non
recyclable waste itself, and to pay a tipping fee on trash that Carbone had already
sorted.
412
Accepting that the immediate effect of the ordinance was to direct local transport
of solid waste to a designated site within the local jurisdiction, the Court nevertheless
found it to have interstate economic effects since it deprives out-of-state businesses of
access to a local market by entrusting the initial processing step of waste to one local
contractor.
413 Not surprisingly the Philadelphia test was chosen over the Pike test, now
that the court found the ordinance discriminatory. 414 One of the main counter arguments
of Clarkstown to differentiate its case from Philadelphia was that its ordinance did not
discriminate because it did not differentiate waste on the basis of its geographic origin: all
waste must be processed at the designated transfer station before it leaves the town. 415
Yet the Court found the article of commerce in this case not so much the waste itself, but
rather the service of processing and disposing it. 416 It even found the protectionist effect
to be "more acute' than in Dean Milk, for it favored a single local proprietor as opposed
to installing a five mile radius limit. 417 The Court was not mild in asserting that
Clarkstown had simply developed a financing measure while any number of
412
Id., at 387-388.
4,J
Id., at 389.
4.4
Id., at 390.
4.5
Ibid.
416
Id., at 391.
4,7
Id., at 392.
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nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as installing uniform safety regulations through
which competitors like Carbone could not underprice the market by "cutting corners on
environmental safety". 418 Another valuable hint from the Court for Clarkstown to
maintain a viable financing scheme was the subsidization of the facility through general
taxes or municipal bonds. 419
In general, regarding waste subsidization it appears that states or political
subdivisions should make sure that the funds collected to subsidize not be obtained from
those competitors of those in-state business or economic interests being subsidized if
they want to pass the constitutional muster. 420 C&A Carbone is arguably one of the most
significant dormant Commerce Clause waste decisions in the 1990s. Not only in its
theoretical stringency, but especially by having struck down a flow control ordinance:
a measure that had become highly popular in more than half the states of the U.S. 421
3. Will the future compromise ?
Seen from a strict point of legal reasoning, the Supreme Court has been praised for
its firm formulaic stance to the benefit of the clarity of general dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 422 Others find that the Supreme Court should stop pigeon-holing all cases
and start to appreciate true environmental measures by focusing more on the actual
4.8
Id., at 393.
4.9
Id, at 394.
420 Stanley E. Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light ofRecent Supreme Court
Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky as Case Study: The Waste Wars, 83 KYLJ
551,599(1995).
421 See Cox, supra note 374, at 180, n. 74 (referring to 27 state statutes).
422 See Hopkirk, supra note 373, at 415.
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interstate trade effect,
4
" and like to take the ECJs Belgian Waste decision as an example nA
To serve the environmentally inspired concerns best it seems more desired to develop a
strong legal doctrine without raising too much confusion for the general jurisprudence,
unlike what the ECJ did. Perhaps, the leniency will have to be found in the growing
together of the Dean Milk 'no adequate alternative' test and the Philadelphia 'virtually
per se test'. Yet proving the waste of out-of-state to be inherently more dangerous will
never be an easy task.
Therefore state representatives have been lobbying for a Congressional action 425
Ironically, because most states are net exporters of hazardous waste, there is far more
more support in Congress for legislation authorizing restrictions on the movement of
municipal solid waste than for hazardous waste. 426 Municipalities also hope that
legislation will expressly authorize some existing flow control ordinances. In 1995, the
Senate approved a bill that would give the states the authority to limit interstate shipment
of municipal waste and to impose fees on out-of-state waste. 427 Currently the bill never
received a vote in the House though. 428
423 Cox, supra note 374, at 168-189; Samuel R Bloom, The Need For.a New Dormant Commerce Clause
Test: a Time to Discard Waste Systems Corp. v. County ofMartin, Minn., 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 80
(1994); Christine M. Fixl, Hazardous Waste and Partial Import Bans: An Environmentally Sound
Exception to he Commerce Clause, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 149 (1992).
424 See Walter, supra note 284, at 1201-1202.
423 See Holly McCann, The Civil War of Waste, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 285, 294-295 (1994).
426 PERCIVAL, MILLER, SCHROEDER and LEAPE, supra note 179, at 433.
427
Ibid.
42t ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER and JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION - LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY - 1998 SUPPLEMENT
36 (Aspen Law & Business, 1998).
Chapter V.
Conclusion
The increasing generation of hazardous wastes on a global level has raised the
acute question of how to control its treatment and disposal.
Differing levels of environmental regulations between countries, mirrored in
varying costs of compliance, an increasing NIMBY awareness and a decrease of the lack
of capacity to dispose of waste in some Western States, have all added to a flourishing
and often illegal trade in transfontier waste movements. Highly publicized toxic scandals
and their corollary public concern, instigated both the international and regional entities to
respond to the overwhelming problems related to the unsound treatment or disposal of
hazardous wastes.
Due to the inherent difficulty to enforce international law in the ICJ, the judicial
control of the transboundary movement of wastes might be more successful under the
umbrella of the European Union with its strong supranational institutions as the EC J,
than under the auspices of the Parties to the Basel Convention. It is hoped that the
enforcement and the implementation of the Convention will increase when the Parties of
the Basel Convention will adopt a Liability Protocol during the COP-5 meeting to be held
in Basel, December 1999. The Basel Ban, laudable in itself, suffers from its OECD/non-
OECD distinction since it will cause less affluent OECD members to become new 'waste
havens'.
The U. S. Supreme Court has only indicated a heightened stringency when
scrutinizing dormant Commerce Clause cases related to the interstate and intrastate
movement of waste. Unlike the ECJ in its Belgian Waste case, the Supreme Court finds
75
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the free market principle and measures to ban out-of-state waste taken by states or its
political subdivisions mutually exclusive, and the latter absolutely intolerable Granted,
the Supreme Court tries to hold on to very clear formulas for the benefit of the dormant
Commerce Clause case law in general. It cannot be overlooked that the Belgian Waste
case created lots of confusion when set against the prior 'free market of goods'
jurisprudence developed by the ECJ. The value of the Belgian Waste case as a precedent
has not been tested since the European Union decided to enact a directly applicable
regulation to tackle the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, allowing the states
to ban waste coming from other European Union members.
A similar legislative approach by the United States is still absent, since the House
of Representatives never came to vote over a bill the Senate had adopted in 1995. A same
reluctance in Parliament can be found regarding the ratification process of the Basel
Convention. Although the signing of the Basel Convention does not seem feasible under
Mr. Clinton's term, it might have a slight chance if his democratic counterpart wins the
imminent election.
Amidst the different legal and administrative approaches taken by the
international community, the European Union and the United States regarding the export
of hazardous waste outside the national boundaries, it should be noticed that all of them
have been influenced by the OECD Recycling Decision for recovery operation to a higher
or lesser extent. Certainly, the global problem of the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste asks for a hermetical and general response by all nations, but one cannot
deny the growing intertwinement of the various legal systems all over the world, as they
let themselves be influenced by the same sources.
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